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Abstract 
 
The 2016 election sparked fundamental changes in American politics. From the 
rise of Donald Trump’s popularity to the growth of progressive protests in response to his 
election and subsequent policies, this paper explores how fundamental changes stemming 
from the 2016 election directly impacted American Jewish interest groups and political 
stances, particularly on the issue of Israel. Prior to the 2016 election, the American 
Jewish community was growing increasingly divided on Israel primarily due to the 
disparate experiences between young Jews and that of older generations, as well as 
increasingly right-wing Israeli politics. However, the election of Trump—and his 
alignment with pro-Israel policies—furthered the already existing divides across 
American Jewish politics. The result has been increased polarization between American 
Jewish groups and the mobilization of progressive groups to counteract pro-Israel 
organizations and Trump’s illiberal policies. This paper aims to illustrate how these 
changes within American Jewish politics are connected to the 2016 election through three 
case studies of Jewish Israel-related organizations from across the political spectrum.  
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1 
Introduction 
About 
The election of President Donald Trump was a tumultuous time in America. The 
months leading up to November 2016, and the months following, elucidated and further 
intensified political polarization across the United States—divisions that often pervaded 
previously united communities. American Jews are just one example of an identity group 
that experienced significant changes following the 2016 election. American Jewish life 
has always had some religious political and cultural divides. However, over the last four 
years, American Jewish interest groups’ mobilization and actions have changed; 
significant growth within and acceptance of particular American Jewish interest groups 
indicates either changes to Americans Jews’ political stances or, at the very least, a 
newfound willingness to mobilize around their beliefs. One example is the liberal pro-
peace and pro-Israel organization J Street has increased its traction in the American 
Jewish community. Moreover, as organizations outside of established American Jewish 
organizations grow in popularity this signifies a shift in the broader representation of 
different viewpoints across organizational life.  
These changes generate a research question: How have fundamental changes in 
America’s political culture shaped American Jews’ political stances and affected the 
representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest groups? I explore this 
research question through three case studies; the American Israel Public Affairs 
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Committee, IfNotNow, and J Street. In these case studies, I analyze the recent internal 
changes within American Jewish organizations related to Israel and/or the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict. I argue that the recent changes within these organizations elucidates 
how the election of Donald Trump has catalyzed changes to American Jewish life. 
This chapter provides an introduction to my research question. I chose to explore 
changes within American Jewish life through changes within organizations, rather than 
overall through polling data. Although the most recent and reliable polling and survey 
data can illustrate the broader religious, political, and cultural trends of American Jews, 
this data alone cannot adequately answer my research question. Instead, an exploration of 
three very different American Jewish Israel-related organizations—each of which have 
experienced significant and important internal changes since 2016—provides a clearer 
picture of how Jewish life has changed. This chapter concludes with a discussion of my 
methodological approach to exploring these three Jewish organizations and a roadmap 
that describes how each chapter contributes to larger arguments in response to my 
research question.  
Polling Data 
In order to understand the changes underlying Jewish political social life, I 
analyze how polling data has approached this question. The lack of recent, unbiased, and 
accurate polling data reveals the need to look deeper at organizational history and 
changes—which is the goal of this thesis. Although the existing sociological research and 
polling depict the broad spectrum of cultural, religious, and political beliefs and practices 
of American Jews, this data falls short of depicting the changes to American Jewish life 
 
 
 6 
since the 2016 election. American Jews hold a vast spectrum of viewpoints on all 
issues—religious, political, cultural, and social. For example, while some do agree with 
the actions and beliefs espoused by President Donald Trump, many disagree with the 
current President’s policies. The vast changes in American politics since 2016 have likely 
impacted American Jewish political life. Nonetheless, there is a lack of recent, 
comprehensive, and unbiased polling of American Jews and reports since 2016, meaning 
that other methodological strategies must be pursued in order to better understand and 
document these changes. Without accurate and recent polling data it is also difficult to 
discern the extent to which apparent changes in American Jewish politics were the result 
of internal factors or have been driven by external American politics. 
The most recent and extensive survey of American Jewish politics, “A Portrait of 
Jewish Americans,” was conducted by Pew Research Center in 2013, several years before 
the more recent changes that I am examining began taking place. This data is still 
important as it depicts the previously existing divides and trends, and can be compared 
across time to the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey.1 However, the lack of more 
recent survey data means that these findings are no longer accurate today, and that it is 
difficult to document how the changes in American politics resulting from the 2016 
election might have spurred changes. Throughout my thesis, I compare the 2013 Pew 
Research Center report to the minimal recent and reliable survey data that I have found. 
 
1 These results are based on two surveys with two different populations. Although they 
provide some structure to compare across time, the surveys’ different methodologies may 
limit the accuracy of comparison. Pew Research Center describes how these differences 
include, “different questions to identify Jews, different questions to examine attitudes and 
demographics, such as intermarriage and child rearing, different approaches in and in 
statistically weighting the data” (Pew Research Center 2013). 
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The survey data I have examined depicts the already existing divides within 
American Jewish life. American Jews are not one unified group with similar beliefs and 
practices; rather, they are a fragmented population with many disagreements over the 
issues, values, and practices that define their ideas of Judaism. To start, American Jews 
are incredibly religiously diverse as illustrated by the vast number of denominations. The 
2013 Survey documented this denominational diversity identifying 35% Reform, 18% 
Conservative, 10% Orthodox (including ultra-Orthodox and Modern Orthodox, 6% other 
(including Reconstructionist and Jewish Renewal movements), and 30% non-
denominational (Pew Research Center 2013, 10). The 2013 survey also denoted a trend of 
decreasing denominational attachment across generations. Compared with the older 
generations, younger Jews were “more likely to have no denominational attachment” 
(Pew Research Center 2013, 49). 
Although there is political diversity, in 2013 American Jews supported the 
Democratic Party over the Republican Party by “more than three-to-one: 70% say they 
are Democrats or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 22% are Republicans or lean 
Republican” (Pew Research Center 2013, 16). This was largely consistent with surveys 
from the decade prior where roughly two-thirds of Jews identified as Democrats or 
Democratic-leaners (Pew Research Center 2013, 96). The voting patterns of American 
Jews in the 2016 presidential election also aligns with the 2013 data, since 71% voted for 
Hilary Clinton, and 23% voted for Donald Trump (CNN 2016). Meanwhile, in the 2018 
midterm elections “roughly eight-in-ten Jewish voters (79%) cast their ballots for 
Democrats (Sciupac and Smith 2018).  
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There is also some alignment between denominational and political affiliation. 
Whereas 77% of Reform Jews and 77% of non-denominational Jews are Democrat or 
lean Democrat, Orthodox Jews do not fit the democratic Jewish paradigm: “roughly 
half…describe themselves as political conservatives, and 57% identify with or lean 
toward the Republican Party” (Pew Research Center 2013, 95).  
The spectrum of beliefs within Jewish America also extends to different notions 
of what practices are essential to Judaism. Today, one of the most polarizing and 
important issues of disagreement is whether attachment to and support for Israel is an 
essential practice. This issue has likely gained traction since the very existence of a 
modern state, and many older Jews’ personal memory of living in a time without a Jewish 
state, pushes the majority of Jews to grapple with what the state does or ought to mean to 
them.  For one population of American Jews today—or 4-in-10—an emotional 
attachment to the modern Jewish state is central to their practice of Judaism. Polling data 
from 2000 and 2013 depicts that the relative number of American Jews who are “very or 
somewhat attached to Israel” has remained relatively stagnant (Cohen, Mott, Blass, 
Schwartz, Ament, Klaff, Kotler-Berkowitz 2001).  
Although many factors might be correlated with emotional attachment to Israel, 
the 2013 profile indicates a correlation between attachment to Israel and particular 
denominational and political affiliations, as well as age. Orthodox and Conservative Jews 
were more likely to see Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (at 55% and 58% 
respectively) as opposed to Reform and non-denominational Jews who are much less 
likely see Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (at 42% and 31% respectively) (Pew 
Research Center 2013, 54). American Jewish Republicans are much more likely to see 
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caring about Israel as an essential part of being Jewish than Democrats (Pew Research 
Center 2013, 57). Moreover, the older generation of American Jews is also more likely to 
be attached to Israel; whereas 35% of American Jews over 50 were very attached to 
Israel, this was true of only 25% of American Jews under the age of 25 (Pew Research 
Center 2013, 54).  
Although for some American Jews Israel is central to their Judaism, many others 
define their identity through other practices and values. According to the Pew Research 
Center 2013 profile, many more of the surveyed American Jews valued four other 
practices higher than Israel. These other values are remembering the Holocaust, leading 
an ethical/moral life, working for justice and equality, and being intellectually curious 
(Pew Research Center 2013, 57). The results of a more recent Jewish Electoral Institute 
poll published in May 2019 similarly illustrated how Jewish Americans today prioritize a 
broad diversity of political issues more than supporting Israel. This JEI survey had Jewish 
voters rank their political priorities and found that “Israel ranked 16th out of 16 issues” 
that mattered when deciding upon which candidate to support; instead they prioritized 
other issues like protecting Medicare and Social Security (Quoted in Rubin 2019).  
 Another area of vast disagreement is approval of President Donald Trump and his 
administration’s policies. Approval of President Trump has been complicated by the 
number of actions Trump has taken to appeal to the pro-Israel camp of Jewish 
Americans. To start, Trump moved the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem. Second, in May of 2018, President Trump withdrew from the much-debated 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the “Iran Deal” which was signed during 
President Barack Obama’s term in 2015. Next, the Trump Administration, in a highly 
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controversial move, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Even more, 
President Trump has not pressured the Israeli government to halt the continuous 
expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In November 2019, the Trump 
administration declared that they do not see Israeli settlements as a violation of 
international law (Lederman and Williams 2019). The combination of these pro-Israel 
policies has contributed to many pro-Israel Jews’ support for Trump.  
Since American Jews are in no way a homogenous group, other American Jews 
have expressed extensive disapproval of President Trump; they disagree for a diversity of 
reasons, making overarching assumptions implausible. For American Jews who identify 
with the Democratic party and are pro-Israel, the election of Trump placed many in an 
uncomfortable position: they had to decide whether they would praise and thank Trump 
for delivering several monumental pro-Israel policies, despite their disagreement with his  
other policies. At an American Jewish event, President Trump appeared to “blur the lines 
between the American Jews in the audience and Israelis,” referring to Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel at one point as “your prime minister” (Cochrane 2019). 
This has led some American Jews who are more critical of Israel to push back on the 
assumption that loyalty to Israel can buy American Jewish votes. A 2019 Pew Research 
Center poll shows that 4-in-10 American Jews believes that Trump is favoring the Israelis 
too much, especially in ways his policies affect the Israel-Palestinian peace process 
(Smith 2019).  
For American Jews who disapprove of President Trump, their beliefs have also 
been largely shaped by Trump’s policies to undermine the rights of other minorities, 
including Muslims, Latinx, and LGTBQ people, among others. Many have mobilized 
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within Jewish and non-Jewish groups to organize against President Trump, particularly 
against those policies that have negatively impacted and undermined minority groups as a 
result of his policies.  
Jewish Americans today are also concerned with how President Trump’s actions 
have affected the physical safety and emotional well-being of American Jews. The 2019 
JEI poll illustrates how many Jewish Americans disapprove of President Trump’s actions 
and policies, as it relates to the security of Jews in America: 
nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of Jewish voters believe Jewish Americans are 
less secure than they were two years ago, 71 percent disapprove of the way 
President Trump has handled anti-Semitism, and nearly 60 percent believe that he 
bears at least some responsibility for the shootings at synagogues in Pittsburgh 
and Poway. (Rubin 2019)  
 
Some American Jews point to Trump’s endorsement by white supremacist groups and 
how the rise of Trump has invigorated the efforts of these groups. For example, they see 
the violent Charlottesville protest in 2017 as a pivotal example of how Trump’s policies, 
such as his immigration policies and the Muslim Ban, have given rise to, and legitimated, 
the intolerance views of extremist hate groups. Even more, the four violent incidents on 
American Jewish communities since October 2018 have invoked fear. Most notable was 
the 2018 Pittsburg shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue which was the largest attack 
on Jewish lives in American history, killing eleven and injuring six (Margollin, Torres, 
Barr 2020). 
Overall, polling data can, in broad brush strokes, indicate that larger changes have 
and are taking place within American Jewish life. The 2013 Pew Poll, for example, does 
provide a clear picture of the previously existing schisms among American Jews before 
the Trump era. However, without unbiased and recent survey data, it is not clear how the 
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2016 election results have interacted with and continue to affect the multitude of 
American Jewish opinions on divisive issues, particularly Israel. The impact of other 
recent and resulting changes in American politics since 2016, like increasing political 
polarization between Republicans and Democrats or the growth of progressive politics 
within the Democratic party on American Jewish political opinions and mobilization, 
requires further examination. This lack of recent, widespread, and unbiased polling data 
has motivated me to look for evidence of how fundamental changes resulting from the 
2016 election directly impacted American Jews’ political mobilization and public 
opinions. Therefore, I instead examine three Israel-related interest groups from a across 
the political spectrum. Examining how particular groups of American Jews with different 
sets of beliefs have changed since 2016 can provide insights to my research question of 
how fundamental changes in American Politics have impacted American Jewish political 
life.  
Interest Groups  
My thesis examines three Israel-related organizations—each with their own 
distinctive values, issues, and strategies—to better illuminate shifts in American Jewish 
life among different segments of the population. The first organization I explore is the 
American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) which is an important member of 
the American Jewish establishment. As a bipartisan pro-Israel lobby group, AIPAC’s 
mission is to “to strengthen, protect and promote the U.S.-Israel relationship in ways that 
enhance the security of the United States and Israel” (AIPAC 2020). Although it is not 
explicitly Jewish, it is the most powerful pro-Israel organization that attracts American 
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Jews and is a member of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations (Cop). As the “vital core” of AIPAC’s membership, American Jews from 
across the country support the organization by donating money, lobbying Congressional 
Representative, attending events like the annual national Policy Conference event in 
Washington, DC, and meeting regionally in local Jewish spaces (Bruck 2014). 
AIPAC exists among a much larger and broader network of establishment 
organizations. Historically, established American Jewish groups have provided a united 
front on Israel, promoting ‘blanket’ support for American pro-Israel and domestic Israeli 
policies. Many of these organizations have existed for decades and serve at the heart of 
American Jewish cultural and religious life. One way of understanding the boundaries of 
the establishment are those organizations who are members of an institution called the 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP). Encompassing 
fifty-one prominent organizations, CoP aims to create an apparent consensus on Jewish 
issues (CoP 2019). Organizations within CoP are voted in by its member organizations. 
While some hold semi-diverse viewpoints, the member organizations have banded 
together to work towards the mission of “advance[ing] the interests of the American 
Jewish community, sustain[ing] broad-based support for Israel and address[ing] the 
critical concerns facing world Jewry” (CoP 2019).  
AIPAC (along with most establishment organizations) can be described by the 
value of “particularism.” This term describes and defines “how Jews see themselves in 
relation to Gentiles, their obligations to those inside and outside the Jewish community, 
and their sense of the purpose of the world” (Barnett 2016, 7). Central to particularisms is 
a notion of Jewish purpose and place in the world as Am Segulah, or “chosen people.” 
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This value understands the Jewish people as distinctly and uniquely situated in the world 
and aligns with how AIPAC understands the Jewish historical experience and advocates 
for the Jewish connection to Israel. 
Throughout American Jewish history, establishment organizations have long 
faced scrutiny and questioning from American Jews who disagree with policies pursued 
on issues like Israel. However, the American Jewish establishment today faces 
unprecedented challenges that stem from other American Jewish organizations. In 
particular, two new organizations—J Street and IfNotNow—have arisen that represent 
the different types of challenges faced by the establishment. These organizations question 
AIPAC (and others) right to power and their ability to dictate American Jewish policy on 
Israel. They also present difficulties to the establishment by drawing otherwise engaged 
membership, particularly among younger generations. While the two organizations are 
similar in that they both challenge the establishment, they take two very different angles.  
My thesis compares how J Street and IfNotNow’s different values, strategies, and 
issues differ from one another, and from AIPAC, as well as how recent changes in 
American politics have affected each group differently. The growth and creation of both 
IfNotNow and J Street are significant for two major reasons. First, they reflect recent 
changes in the viewpoints of American Jews over controversial issues like Israel. Second, 
the founding of these organizations marks a new period in American Jewish life as they 
provide the space for better representation of diverse viewpoints outside the structure of 
the American Jewish establishment.  
The second case study follows IfNotNow (INN), a Jewish progressive activist 
group that was founded during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict by American Jews who were 
 
 
 15 
“angered by the overwhelmingly hawkish response of American Jewish institutions” 
(INN 2019). The organization’s goal to “end American Jewish support for the 
occupation,” seeks to ground their movement in the “values of Jewish tradition” (INN 
2019). Unlike the Jewish establishment that is defined by the value of particularism, INN 
has embraced universalism (Barnett 2016, 7). Universalism encompasses an obligation to 
care for all people around the world, whereas particularism prioritizes care for other 
Jews.  
One way that INN has challenged the American Jewish establishment is through 
protests outside AIPAC’s annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC. Comparing the 
growth in the number of protestors between 2016 and 2017 provides a clear indication of 
the changes and challenges to American Jewish life today. Whereas in 2016, INN’s 
protest was comprised of approximately 200 people, by 2017 the number of American 
Jews who mobilized outside of AIPAC’s policy conference grew by 500 percent. This 
was the largest, mostly Jewish, protest in AIPAC’s organization’s 54-year history with 
more than 1000 protestors present (Bellware 2017). Although American Jews have long 
protested and questioned the policies of established Jewish organizations, this particular 
protest should be regarded as significant both due to its magnitude and implications to the 
status quo among American Jewry.  
The third organization, J Street, stands somewhere in the middle between INN 
and AIPAC in terms of its values, issues, and strategies. Founded in 2007, J Street 
embraces Zionism, as it “organizes and mobilizes pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans who 
want Israel to be secure, democratic and the national home of the Jewish people” (J Street 
2019). However, J Street is distinct from establishment organizations that embrace 
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‘blanket’ support for Israel; the organization questions Israeli and American policies that 
go against the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and a future two-state solution. By 
recognizing Israel as a Jewish national home while also promoting the values of peace, 
democracy, and co-existence, J Street straddles the values of universalism and 
particularism. In recent years, the organization has attracted Democratic presidential 
primary candidates to speak at its annual national conference—many of whom previously 
would have likely supported AIPAC instead; this choice might depict an evolving 
Democratic party that is now more critical of Israel.  
The existing literature on recent changes within American Jewish politics, 
especially related to Israel, approaches the subject in three different ways. One approach 
understands these changes through the lens of ‘critical engagement:’ critique and 
questioning of Israel and related policies are driven out of care for the future of the 
Jewish state (Waxman 2017, 181). Another approach views young American Jews’ 
criticism of Israel and their increasing disinterest in traditional institutions with pro-Israel 
policies as indicating a growing culture of indifference (Beinart 2010). Meanwhile, the 
third approach interprets these changes as a part of a broader trend towards embracing the 
values of social justice and tikkun olam (or repairing the world) over others like 
Zionism); these values are what have driven many American Jews to criticize the actions 
of the Israeli government, and American Jewish institutions unwavering support for Israel 
(Omer 2019) (Barnett 2017). My research explores these three threads, and places them 
in conversation with my organizational analysis, to show why, how, and to what extent 
changes to American Jewish life are taking place.  
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My thesis explores how the rise of President Trump, and the resulting 
unprecedented changes in American political culture, has affected American Jewish life. 
The lack of recent and comprehensive survey data since the 2016 election means that my 
methodology necessarily focuses on understanding interest group representation after 
2016. Although both the groups that I explore in opposition to AIPAC and the broader 
establishment were founded prior to the election, these groups have mobilized 
significantly following the election. The growing array of American Jewish interest 
groups, particularly on the left and far-left, and their increasing popularity among 
American Jews since 2016 should not be overlooked. My research tries to understand the 
extent to which these changes are connected to broader changes in American society, 
particularly the massive mobilization of political movements on the left to resist Trump’s 
policies, as opposed to the previously existing internal trends within American Jewish 
political life. My research question is thus important not only to American Jews but also 
has implications for and may relay broader changes within American society. 
Methodology 
To understand how monumental changes within American politics have affected 
American Jewish life, I compare the values, strategies, and issues of AIPAC, INN, J 
Street. I chose to study these three organizations as opposed to others for three reasons. 
First, they are all engaging on similar topics: the American Jewish relationship to Israel. 
Second, existing literature depicts to some extent the changes within these three 
organizations; for AIPAC this has meant challenge and for the others, this has meant 
growth in membership and popularity. Third, each organization’s mission and actions 
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provide a clear depiction of the different categories of American Jewish organization 
values and issues.  
After describing the values, strategies, and issues of each organization, I explore 
how fundamental changes in American politics since the 2016 election have impacted 
each organization. I rely upon existing literature in order to find evidence for, interpret, 
and understand the recent internal changes within each of the three American Jewish 
organizational case studies. To understand and depict how these organizations view 
themselves, I use the organizations’ websites and other primary source materials 
wherever possible. I also utilize journal articles and other recent literature that help fill in 
the gaps to depict changes within these three organizations. 
Roadmap 
In the following chapter, I conduct a literature review that provides the theoretical 
framework for my argument surrounding the significant changes to American Jewish 
organizational life since the 2016 election through contextualizing these changes among 
the previously existing trends and divisions within American Jewish politics. Chapter 
three discusses how the positive and negative Jewish responses to recent changes in 
Jewish Israel-politics are representative of Jews’ excitement or anxiety at aspects of their 
faith being influenced by the modern world. I also explore the differences between 
Jewish Israel-related organizations, present a framework to differentiate between three 
groups of organizations, and delve into three case study organizations. Chapter four then 
analyzes how changes within American political culture have directly impacted AIPAC, 
IfNotNow, and J Street. I look at how broad changes within American politics have 
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affected mainstream politics and public opinion on Israel, and in turn how this has 
impacted each organizations’ ability to mobilize American Jews and promote their own 
belief system regarding the American Jewish relationship to Israel.  
My conclusion argues that the three case studies illuminate the very apparent and 
recent changes to American Jewish life. These changes were a result of previously 
existing trends, including generational differences, that were then accelerated by the 2016 
election. These shifts in political opinions and representation need to be recognized and 
grappled with by American Jewish leaders. These effects are also significant on 
American politics by serving as an example of how the 2016 election affected minority, 
religious, and affinity groups.  
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2 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
My thesis explores the research question: How have fundamental changes in 
America’s political culture shaped American Jews’ political stances and affected the 
representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest groups? This research 
query views the recent changes within American political life as an independent variable. 
I seek to understand to what extent this variable has catalyzed changes within Jewish 
political culture. In particular, I discern to what extent the changes in American politics 
since the 2016 election have affected American organizational life, such as catalyzing 
membership growth in certain organizations or creating challenges to an organization’s 
values. Exploring changes within American Jewish organizations helps indicate that one 
or both of the following phenomena have occurred: first, that American Jewish political 
viewpoints are evolving; second, that American Jews have mobilized into new and 
diverse organizations that better represent the diversity of viewpoints. 
This chapter examines the extent to which the existing debates in literature 
recognize these changes and what theories are presented and deployed to explain why 
those changes occurred. While some authors, consistent with the argument developed in 
this thesis, point to Trump as an important catalyst of change within American Jewish 
life, others either reject or question that there have been any changes altogether. Much of 
the literature points to other variables as responsible for effecting American Jewish life, 
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such as a fundamental change in the Jewish condition or prioritization of liberal values. 
While these variables were necessary preconditions, the rise of Trump was a key catalyst 
of this effect. My empirical analysis in later chapters of organizational changes 
contributes to current debates by presenting evidence that the election of Trump, and the 
subsequent political polarization and progressive protests in response his election, 
furthered previously existing schisms and trends within Jewish American politics. This 
chapter provides an exhaustive literature review to describe how prominent authors 
understand the extent to which changes have occurred and the variable responsible for 
these changes. 
Argument 
There is minimal survey data that presents evidence for or against the fact that 
American Jews’ political opinions or willingness to mobilize regarding Israel has 
changed over time; however, recent challenges and/or growth since 2016 within three 
prominent American Jewish organizations engaged from many angles in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict illustrates how the 2016 election catalyzed changes in American 
Jewish political life. American political trends—among them the rise of Trump, political 
polarization, and schisms within the Democratic party—should not be interpreted as 
solely responsible for these changes but rather should be understood as having 
accelerated what were already existing variables and discord within American Jewish life 
previously. These variables are elaborated further within this chapter and demonstrate the 
already existing features at play prior to the 2016 election. 
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Distancing  
This section examines the debate around whether there have been significant 
changes to American Jewish life, specifically whether American Jews are becoming more 
distanced from Israel. These works frame a response to my research question around a 
shifting Jewish attachment to Israel. Later in this chapter, I explore this research question 
from an angle that does not place attachment to Israel at the center, but rather understands 
how a shift in values contributed to overall changes to American Jewish life today. 
For decades, American Jews have debated the meaning, significance, and 
potential consequence of the data that shows that “American Jews, especially younger 
ones, are becoming less attached to Israel” (Waxman 2017, 179). American Jewish 
sociologists have presented two “distancing hypothesis” concerning this phenomenon 
that question the extent to which American “distancing from Israel has or has not been 
occurring in American Jewish society” (Sheskin 2012, 27). I have chosen to explore these 
“distancing” hypotheses as they are the lens through which existing literature has 
approached my research question, thereby helping to place my argument in conversation 
with existing literature. 
The first hypothesis, or “life-cycle” effect, states that younger Jews are less 
attached than older Jews, yet as they grow older they will become more attached, thus 
mitigating any future changes in the total overall attachment (Sasson, Phillips, Wright, 
Kadushin, and Saxe 2012, 67). This relies on the basic assumption that as we age “our 
political attitudes and behavior change in highly predictable ways—we become more 
conservative, clannish, and concerned with our immediate (and primordial) community” 
(Barnett 2016, 204).  
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The second hypothesis, or “generational effect,” disagrees with the first 
hypothesis; rather it argues that the younger generation will not grow in their attachment 
over time, thereby leading to an overall future decrease in the attachment to Israel 
(Sheskin 2012, 27). These hypotheses frame the differences in attachment between 
younger and older generations as either a “life-cycle” or “generational” effect (Sasson, 
Phillips, Wright, Kadushin, and Saxe 2012, 67).    
The Life-Cycle Effect  
While there is a range of surveys and polls that show that American Jewish 
attachment to Israel has remained relatively stagnant, the reliability and accuracy of this 
data is questionable. Prominent American Jewish sociologists, including Theodore 
Sasson, Leonard Saxe, and others, have argued that a “preponderance of evidence 
supports the view that emotional attachment to Israel increased over the life course rather 
than declined across the generations” (Sasson, Phillips, Wright, Kadushin, and Saxe 
2012, 67). The Pew Research Center 2013 Survey and the 2000 National Jewish 
Population Survey discussed earlier does provide findings that align with this hypothesis, 
illustrating that young American Jews showed less attachment than that of those older 
generations at the time.  
I agree with Michael Barnett that the data regarding distancing has “real 
limitations” (Waxman 2018, 475). Barnett points to the difficulties in understanding what 
it means for a respondent to describe themselves as pro-Israel or anti-Israel, as there is a 
broad diversity of positions that could fall into either of these categories, regarding the 
peace process, settlement expansion, Israeli security, the right for Palestinian statehood, 
and the list continues (Waxman 2018, 475). Moreover, I second Barnett’s appeal to 
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question the reliability of survey data in general on this topic, for the results can be easily 
changed or manipulated depending upon question-wording, sequencing, and the overall 
survey pool (Waxman 2018, 475).  
My organizational analyses in chapters three and four provide evidence against 
the life-cycle effect. My analysis confirms the generational hypothesis—that young 
American Jews have and continue to grow more distant from Israel over time. Survey 
data alone cannot prove that the first hypothesis is true. However, the growth of Jewish 
progressive and center-left movements, founded by and/or engaging young Jewish 
Americans, reveal that this generation of young Jewish Americans is fundamentally 
different than those from previous generations. By drawing upon an organization analysis 
as opposed to survey data, my thesis helps to disprove the first hypothesis. The 
generational effect has been furthered by changes within American politics since 2016. 
The later sections in this chapter regarding the unique attributes young Jewish 
Americans, as well as an increasingly fractured Israeli American relationship and vision 
for a Jewish future, also serve as evidence that young American Jews will not increase 
their attachment to Israel with age. 
The next subsection describes the primary differences in generational memories 
between older and younger generations of American Jews today that are likely 
responsible for ‘distancing;’ the next section about young Jewish Americans today, also 
contributes evidence that this generation is fundamentally different from those 
generations that came before it, meaning that their attachment to Israel will not increase 
with time.  
Generational memories 
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The different generational memories are partially responsible for distancing in 
emotional attachment to Israel. Sociologists who support the “generational” hypothesis 
believe that the age-related difference is bound to lead to an “intergenerational decline;” 
the eldest generation will inevitably be replaced by those generations that come after it 
(Cohen and Kelman 2007, 2). Moreover, not only will there be an inevitable replacement, 
but also that future generations do not share the same lived experiences and memories of 
those generations prior.  
The oldest generations are most familiar with a narrative of Judaism surrounding 
victimhood because they are more likely to have been present during periods of overt 
discrimination, such as the Holocaust, and the formation of Israel in 1948. Their 
experience of Israel is most clearly defined by a long history of Jewish persecution 
culminating in the 19th-century tragedy of the Holocaust. According to a 2012 survey, 68 
percent of American Jews aged over sixty describes the Holocaust as a very important 
Jewish experience that has impacted political beliefs, compared to the 41 percent of 
American Jews aged between 18 to 39 who agree (Jones and Cox 2012, 7). Thus, 
American Jews who were born before World War II, or in its aftermath, have an 
understanding of Judaism that has been shaped by suffering from violent and prevalent 
anti-Semitism. Many see the founding of the modern state of Israel as a redemption from 
the previous state of wandering and uncertainty about their survival. For members of the 
Baby Boomer generation, their opinions of Israel have been shaped by memories of the 
Six-Day War in 1967 in which Israel succeeded in fighting five of its neighbors. The 
1967 war also served as an important turning point in American Jewish history; it is 
widely assumed to be the “high-water mark of American Jewry’s support for Israel” 
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(Barnett 2016, 199). These memories shape the perceptions of Israel for the oldest 
generations today, continuing to view Israel as the underdog ‘David’ from the biblical 
story of David and Goliath.  
Meanwhile, the youngest generations of American Jews hold very different 
memories of Israel. While many have been exposed to the narratives of the generations 
prior through Jewish youth institutions, such as day schools, youth groups, and Sunday 
schools, they have not lived through similar historical experiences as generations prior. 
Daniel Gordis, an American-born Israeli thinker, wrote in his recent book We Stand 
Divided about the incredible differences between how young American Jews came 
together during times of conflict in Israel during the 1970s versus today. For example, he 
juxtaposed his experiences as a child at a Jewish summer camp in 1976 during the 
hijacking of an Air France plane on route from Tel Aviv to Paris with that of the critical 
response from a group of young Jews during the 2014 war. In 1976, hundreds of campers 
gathered together to celebrate when Israel’s strong-armed response to the hijacking led to 
the release of 102 of 106 hostages (Gordis 2019, 11-12). Likewise, in the summer of 
2014, during the violence of Operation Protective Edge, a group of young American Jews 
(that would later form the organization IfNotNow) came together to demand that Israel 
“stop the war on Gaza, end the occupation, and freedom and dignity of all;” as Gordis 
points out, their demands had no mention of the simultaneously occurring Hamas-led war 
on Israel (Gordis 2019, 12-13).   
Sociologists Steven Cohen and Ari Kelman described the events that likely 
shaped the memories Jews born in the years following 1974: The First Lebanon War in 
1982, the First Intifada, the Second Intifada, and the Second Lebanon War. Cohen and 
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Kelman argue that the moral and political complexity of these events means that younger 
generations are thus “less likely to cast Israel in a positive, let alone heroic light” (Cohen 
and Kelman 2007, 3). Moreover, the lack of clear, genuine, and believable efforts at 
creating peace in Israel-Palestine may also shape the youngest generation’s memories. 
Although there were some efforts at creating peace and stability, such as Camp David II 
in 2000, these efforts have all largely failed, and have often devolved into violence, 
particularly with the Second Intifada from late 2000 through 2005. As Jonathan Weisman 
described, “younger American Jews do not typically remember Israel as the David 
against regional Goliaths. They see a bully, armed and indifferent, 45 years past the Yom 
Kippur War, the last conflict that threatened Israel’s existence” (Weisman 2019). Gordis 
similarly echoed that they have known no other Israel than that of the “start-up nation”: 
“powerful, stable, (seemingly) invulnerable…the reason that the Palestinians live such 
unfortunate lives” (Gordis 2019, 33).  
Young Jewish Americans Today 
 Beyond distinct generational memories, the recent changes to American Jewish 
life are a product of the major demographic differences between young American Jews 
and older generations. While there are several distinguishable differences, among the 
most impactful are the much higher rates of intermarriage in Jewish society, the 
multifaceted technological capabilities that have shaped the way people interact and gain 
knowledge, and, most importantly, the embrace of liberal values.2 Many of these distinct 
 
2 Although these differences have been most impactful to the youngest generations of 
American Jews, their effect has not solely been limited to the youngest population.   
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qualities are also limited to non-Orthodox Jews who make up around 89% of the Jewish 
population under 30 (Pew Research Center 2013, 49). 
Young American Jews today live in both a Jewish and secular society dissimilar 
to that of generations prior. Overall, Jewish communities have followed in the footsteps 
of broader American society and have grown more secular—an outcome that is likely 
both the product and the result of higher rates of intermarriage. Since the 1970s, rates of 
intermarriage among Jews have increased dramatically; between 2005 and 2013, nearly 
six-in-ten of the net American Jewish population married a non-Jewish spouse, compared 
to just 17% before 1970. Intermarriage has occurred almost exclusively in non-Orthodox 
communities as only 2% have a non-Jewish spouse (Pew Research Center 2013, 9). As a 
result, younger American Jews today are much more likely than the generation of their 
parents to be from a family of intermarried parents. Waxman describes how this has 
“undoubtedly” impacted the young American Jews whose parents are intermarried: they 
are more liberal and significantly less attached to Israel (Waxman 2016, 137). 
The rapid technological innovations available to Jewish Americans at a young age 
are also a primary generational difference. They not only have quick and easy access to 
information but also are exposed to a wide variety of viewpoints through social media. 
Social media platforms also make it easier for people across the country or world to 
connect with one another and share ideas. In the past, the information that youths might 
receive about issues, such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, would have been more limited. 
Without the depth and breadth of easily accessible information online, it was more 
difficult to question the narrative that the Jewish establishment shared about Israel. Since 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a widely contested issue today, one does not have to look far 
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or hard to find a multitude of opinions. American Jewish organizations, particularly those 
with a young and liberal membership, have used social media to their advantage. 
Organizations can harness social media as a tool to not only share their ideas but also to 
reach and mobilize individuals who they otherwise would have difficulty connecting 
with. By making it easier to share content, advertise for events, and gain membership, 
social media has played a role in helping to revolutionize American Jewish life.   
Young Jewish Americans’ liberal political views have also largely affected their 
perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The overall Jewish population is nearly 
twice as liberal as the total United States population. Even still, young Jewish adults are 
more liberal and less conservative than older cohorts. According to a 2019 Jewish 
electorate study at Brandeis, Jews ages 18-34 were 50% liberal and only 14% 
conservative, compared to Jews ages 65+ who are 36% liberal and 27% conservative 
(Saxe, Tighe, Kramer, Parmer, Nussbaum, Kallista, and Seabrum 2019). In fact, young 
American Jews are more liberal than non-Jewish Americans of the same age. 
Many of the factors mentioned have also made young American Jews more 
acquainted with and sympathetic to the Palestinian narrative. Social media has helped 
expose American Jews to Palestinian’s perspective. Yet, the most important aspect is 
young Jewish American’s largely liberal identity. Today’s most widespread and 
successful social justice movements—from the Women’s March to Black Lives Matter—
use “intersectional activism,” meaning that they support “a wide variety of issues, 
including discrimination by sex, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, nationality, 
disability, religion and other marginalized statuses” (Heany 2019). Among intersectional 
issues is support for the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom, justice, and equality 
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through the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS). BDS is a highly controversial 
movement, particularly on college campuses, that works to “end international support for 
Israel's oppression of Palestinians and pressure Israel to comply with international law” 
(BDS 2020). For American Jews who also are pro-Israel, supporting these social 
movements means grappling with how the BDS movement aligns with their other values. 
The many differences mentioned that make young Jewish Americans’ identity and 
experiences fundamentally different from generations prior presents evidence against the 
first distancing hypothesis, or the Life-Cycle Effect. Beyond the generational distinctions 
discussed in this section, American and Israeli Jewish communities have groups that are 
increasingly disparate. This trend is interlinked with the growing generational differences 
between younger and older Americans such that the increasingly liberal beliefs, secular 
practices, and universalist perception of Jewish life have come into conflict with Israeli 
Jews’ religious, cultural, and political sentiments. 
“Twin Portraits”: American and Israeli Jews 
The changes within the American Jewish community are not solely internal; 
rather, they are a product of the growing divide between American and Israeli Jews. 
Among recent literature, many authors have approached the changes within American 
Jewish life through the lens of a struggling relationship between American and Israeli 
Jews today. For example, Alon Pinkas’ article titled “Sorry Israel, US Jewry just isn’t 
that into you” described the waning of a 30 year “love affair” (Pinkas 2017, 1). After 
serving for 30 years as a unifying cause, the reign of a unique Israeli-American 
relationship has grown precarious. American Jews’ embrace of liberal values stands at 
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odds with the “intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” decades of occupation, and an 
Israeli dismissal of Reform and Conservative identity, an identity that comprises 80% of 
the American Jewish community (Pinkas 2017, 2).  
Two recent books similarly echo the role of Israel in an American Jewish divide. 
Daniel Gordis’ (2019) book We Stand Divided argued that the “split between American 
Jews and Israel was causing a split within the American Jewish community” (Gordis 
2019, 21). While one group of American Jews has grown “exasperated” with Israel, 
another group of “right-of-center” American Jews has grown “exasperated” with the first 
group, creating internal American Jewish conflict. Dov Waxman’s (2016) book Trouble 
in the Tribe shares similar concerns, exploring the increasingly contentious place of Israel 
within American Jewish society. The recent polarization within American Jewish life 
stems from a growing group of American Jews disenfranchised and dissatisfied with 
Israel’s right-wing policies, especially as it relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
treatment of the Palestinian people.  
 The ideological differences between the two largest Jewish population centers 
plays a central role in this divide. The personal affinity or ‘bond’ between the two groups 
should not be ignored; nearly 4-in-10 American Jews have visited at least once, and many 
with family spanning the two nations. Nonetheless, the two populations live in vastly 
different societies. Unlike their American Jewish counterparts who are approximately 
50% liberal, nearly 4-in-10 Israeli Jews identify as politically right-wing (Pew Research 
Center 2013, 96). American Jews live in a diverse and majority-Christian society, 
whereas Israeli Jews live in a majority Jewish population (Pew Research Center 2017). 
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The Pew Research Center’s 2017 “Twin Portraits” also demonstrated the two group’s 
diverging understandings of what being Judaism means to them: 
Americans are far more likely than Israelis to say that pursuing ethics, 
morality and justice in society, as well as displaying “intellectual curiosity” and 
having a “good sense of humor,” are essential to what being Jewish means to 
them. Israeli Jews, meanwhile, more commonly highlight observance of Jewish 
law and a connection to Jewish history, culture or community (Pew Research 
Center 2017). 
 
The differing religious affiliations are also an important distinction. As discussed 
in chapter 1, nearly half of American Jews affiliate as Conservative or Reform; both 
affiliations’ religious practices are designed to accommodate living and socializing in the 
modern-day and outside of the Jewish community. Although half of Israeli Jewish society 
is secular, non-Orthodox American Jews hold religious, cultural, and political beliefs that 
clash with the other half of Israeli Jews made up of Masorti (traditional), Dati (religious 
Zionists), or Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews. For example, the Datiim holds political views 
that “entwine religious identity and nationalism,” “identify with the right [wing], to favor 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and to say Arabs should be expelled or transferred 
from Israel” (Pew Research Center 2017).  
The conflict between American Jews and Israel as well as that within Jewish 
American society can be understood as a quarrel over two visions of how Jews exist in 
the world. As presented in the introduction, the opposing values of “particularism” and 
“universalism” create different movements and visions of what it means to be a Jew. This 
same conflict of values is wrapped up in the state of Israel’s history and laws. Defined as 
a Jewish, democratic state, Israel’s politics and identity travels between two poles: a 
homeland for the Jewish people and a thriving western ‘democracy.’ In recent years, the 
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pendulum has swung closer towards a particularistic Jewish vision for Israel. One 
example that depicts this trend is that, in 2018, the Israeli government passed the nation-
state law, protecting and guaranteeing the democratic rights of only its Jewish citizens. 
For the parts of American Jewish society that support a “universalist” vision of Judaism 
defined by support for diversity and freedom for all, Israel’s actions and policies stand 
opposed to their values. As Gordis describes, “it is, in short, not an Israel they can love or 
support. If anything, it is Israel that they must resist” (Gordis 2019, 25). American Jewish 
differences are therefore fueled by disagreeing values and are only furthered as Israel 
takes ‘particularistic actions’ that directly affect a potential future Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process. 
The broad diversity of practices and beliefs within both American and Israeli 
populations means that it is difficult to understand how and if these two groups are 
moving closer or further apart. However, this section, and the section prior regarding 
young Jewish Americans, presents evidence that the Israeli-American relationship is 
evolving. The connection between these two factors—the growing generational 
differences of young Jewish Americans and dissimilar experiences of American and 
Israeli Jews—can not and should not be ignored. American Jews (particularly younger 
populations) increasing criticism and dissatisfaction with Israeli policies, Israeli Jews’ 
particularistic interpretation of Judaism, and American Jewish systems that lend 
unwavering support to the Israeli government indicate that broader changes to American 
Jewish life have begun to take form. 
 
 
 34 
What Changes Have Taken Place? 
Two factors serve as a precondition for the changes in American Jewish life 
today: first, young Jewish Americans live in a world different than generations prior; 
Second, Israeli and American visions of Judaism are continuously growing apart. The 
fundamental changes within American politics since 2016 do not serve as the cause of the 
changes to American Jewish life today; rather the multitude of ways in which American 
politics has evolved—provoking widespread polarization, evoking a left-progressive 
divide within the Democratic Party, reshaping altogether the values of the Republic Party, 
and shaping diplomatic norms around the American Presidency—has brought forward the 
already existing variables of change within American Jewish political life, particularly on 
the issue of Israel. Prior to 2016, new and alternative organizations were already founded 
and growing in popularity. Nonetheless, alterations to American politics, leading to the 
rise and popularity of progressive movements and leaders as well as the decreasing 
popularity of bipartisanship, accelerated the growth and popularity of left-leaning 
movements and challenged group’s ability to maintain bipartisanship. 
Since these trends started far before the rise of Trump, and were instead 
accelerated by the 2016 election, American Jewish political thinkers have long debated 
and upheld disagreeing visions that describe how and to what extent decreasing American 
Jewish attachment to Israel has taken place. While some authors believe that young 
American Jews’ criticism of Israel and their increasing disinterest in traditional 
institutions with pro-Israel policies indicates a culture of indifference, others point to this 
criticism as a sign that young Jewish Americans are continuing to engage with Israel but 
in new and critical ways. While these theories represent the changing attachments for 
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some groups of young Jews, they do not fully encapsulate what is happening in rapidly 
growing progressive Jewish movements, particularly IfNotNow. This section will 
compare these two initial theories with Atalia Omer’s argument in Days of Awe: 
Reimagining Jewishness in Solidarity with Palestinians. Omer’s theory best illustrates 
how the root of criticism from the Jewish far left and progressive movements today stems 
from an “indignation against injustice done in their name” by Israel, and how communal 
protests for Palestinian Solidarity have led to a reimagination of Jewishness (Omer 2019). 
Growing criticism of Israel stems from a reimagination of Jewishness with the value of 
social justice at the center informing their solidarity with Palestinians. Each of these three 
theories presents an important part of the picture surrounding the most pertinent changes 
to American Jewish life today. 
Indifference 
The first theory understands the changes within American Jewish life as a result 
of the growing culture of indifference towards Israel among young Jews. One proponent 
is Peter Beinart, a professor of journalism and political science at the City University of 
New York. In his much discussed and highly controversial New York Review of Books 
article “The Failure of the American Jewish establishment,” Beinart presented evidence 
that young American Jews have grown indifferent to Israel. He began the article by 
pointing to a 2003 study by pollster Frank Luntz who was hired by Jewish philanthropies 
to explain why Jewish college students were not more “vigorously rebutting campus 
criticism of Israel” (Beinart 2010, 1). Luntz’s study found that in the six times that Jewish 
youth were brought together to talk about their Jewishness and connection to Israel, every 
time “the topic of Israel did not come up until it was prompted. Six times these Jewish 
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youth used the word ‘they’ rather than ‘us’ to describe the situation” (quoted in Beinart 
2010). By drawing upon this study and others, Beinart sought to lend support for his 
theory that there is a growing culture of indifference to Israel among young Jews.  
Beinart also claimed that major American Jewish organizations’ refusal to defend 
democracy in the Jewish state is alienating many young liberal Jews from Zionism 
itself—a point elaborated in his 2012 book The Crisis of Zionism. The policies of 
organizations like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations, according to Beinart, are responsible for this effect. The establishment’s 
policy of ‘blanket’ support for Israel stands opposed to young Jews liberal vision of 
Zionism—a vision that both upholds democratic ideals and serves as a safeguard for the 
Jewish people—and their desire for an “open and frank” discussion surrounding how this 
vision falls short.  
I agree with Beinart that the heart of this disagreement is rooted in the “defining 
values of American Jewish political culture,” these being “a belief in open debate, a 
skepticism about military force, [and] a commitment to human rights” (Beinart 2010). 
However, I believe that describing the effect of such policies as a growing culture of 
indifference does not fully encapsulate the changes to American Jewish life today. 
Instead, I believe that young Jews’ embrace of liberal values, and the conflict of these 
values with establishment policies, have inspired many different types of reactions. These 
different types of reactions can be seen through the formation of organizations that run 
counter to the traditional center-right- and right-wing establishment organizations’ 
policies. The following subsections on critical engagement and Jewish reimagination, 
and the examples presented within my case study chapters of many types of Jewish 
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organizations, illustrate how the increasing prominence of liberal values have inspired 
several reactions among American Jews today.  
Critical Engagement 
 While Dov Waxman agrees with Beinart that Jewish organizations serve as 
“intellectual bodyguards for Israeli leaders who threaten the very liberal values they 
profess to admire” (Beinart 2016, 1), he disagrees with Beinart’s assessment of how 
American Jews have reacted. Waxman does not believe that “young American Jews are 
emotionally detached and disconnected from Israel” (Waxman 2017). Waxman (2017) 
instead argues that young Jews are actually “more engaged with Israel than their 
predecessors,” yet are also more critical. He believes that criticism should be viewed as a 
form of engagement, not disengagement.  (Waxman 2017, 177). Waxman describes these 
changes as a form of ‘critical engagement’ with Israel and argues that it is a manifestation 
of “attachment, not alienation” with Israel (Waxman 2017, 181).  
 Waxman’s critical engagement argument can be contextualized by evidence that, 
for American Jews, criticism of Israel is not an entirely new nor unaccepted phenomenon. 
The 2013 Pew Research Center poll found that 89% of the net Jewish population 
surveyed believed that being strongly critical of Israel is compatible with being Jewish 
(Pew Research Center 2013, 58). Moreover, Jews overall, not only the youngest 
population, have grown more critical of Israel: 42% of American Jews said that Trump 
favors Israel too much, a number far greater than is true for Catholics and Christians 
(Smith 2019). Waxman points to similar reasons to those mentioned in my section on 
Young American Jews as to why younger generations have grown more critical, arguing 
that young Jews are more liberal, more oriented towards universalism than older 
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generations, that the Holocaust and anti-Semitism have had less of an impact on their 
lives, and that they hold different “generational” memories (Waxman 2017, 178). The 
growing differences between Israel and America, described in the Twin Portraits Section, 
are also responsible for growing criticism.  
While I agree with Waxman that for some American Jews criticism has been a 
form of engagement, I believe that these changes have more to do with the increasing 
central importance of tikkun olam, and less to do with attachment to Israel. Growing 
criticism of Israel by young Jews’ should be primarily understood not through the lens of 
‘love’ or ‘care’ for Israel (or critical engagement) but rather should be construed as 
rooted in an embrace of Jewish values of universalism and practice of tikkun olam, or 
repairing the world. American Jews’ growing criticism of Israel are a product of the 
liberal values that compels them to do so, as opposed to an attachment to the holy land.  
Michael Barnett’s (2016) The Stars and the Stripes provides a foundation to 
understand the historical roots of tikkun olam and its increasing importance to American 
Jewish identity today. Barnett describes how, prior to 1960, the term tikkun olam was 
hardly mentioned. The term started circulating starting in 1970 and, in the decades 
following, became incorporated into Conservative Judaism’s statement of principles, as 
well as in the 1990s became well-known in Jewish households across America. Tikkun 
olam differs from other similar Jewish terms like tzedakah, or justice, that are “often 
associated with giving to one’s own,” for it is generally assumed to refer to “giving to 
non-Jews” (Barnett 2016, 219). This differentiates the former action as closer in line with 
cosmopolitanism and  the later with tribal values (Barnett 2016, 219) 
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Reimagination of Jewishness 
Omer’s argument builds upon existing literature that demonstrates how tikkun 
olam now serves a more central role today among American Jews by researching how 
young Jews’ liberal values have led them to Palestinian Solidarity, ultimately resulting in 
a reimagination of their Jewishness. Omer conducted sociological research through 
interviews with 70 Jewish American Palestinian solidarity activists, engaged across four 
progressive Jewish activist groups—Open Hillel, INN, Center for Jewish Non-violence, 
and Jewish Voices for Peace. Omer found that Jewish Palestinian Solidarity movements 
are both the outcome of changes in American Jewish life, as well as serve as a continuous 
catalyst for the rethinking of a transformation of what it means to be Jewish. Her theory 
goes beyond Waxman and Beinart to understand decreasing attachment to Israel instead 
around the growth of liberal values among young Jewish Americans. 
All three theories discussed provide an important piece to the larger picture of 
what is happening in American Jewish life today. Young American Jews today are far 
less willing to accept the establishment’s narrative around Israel. They instead seek to 
openly discuss where and how Israel’s policies (and their American backing by American 
politicians and Jewish leaders) fall short of a vision of a liberal, democratic Jewish state. 
Young Jews are much more willing and open than preceding generations to criticize the 
Jewish state in these ways. This is likely due to a broad combination of factors including 
generational differences, liberal values, and Israel’s much more privileged and powerful 
position today. While some Jews certainly have grown indifferent to Israel, and others 
criticize Israel out of love, the most interesting and significant trend that has arisen is the 
increasing presence and growth of Jewish social justice and Palestinian solidarity 
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movements. The growth of these movements is interesting for two reasons. First, they 
constitute a new trend in American Jewish life with relation to attachment to Israel. 
Second, the rise of these Jewish anti-occupation movements has also contributed to new 
forms of Jewish practice and life through integrating religious and cultural practices into 
their activism.   
I will build upon these insights to do an empirical analysis of recent changes in 
the organizational life of American Jews.  My case studies depict the extent to which 
changes in American politics have contributed, effected, or motivated trends towards 
indifference, critical engagement, and/or the reimagination of Jewishness through 
Palestinian solidarity activism. I argue that political trends in the United States since 2016 
towards party polarization and internal shifts within the Democratic party have 
challenged the establishment institution’s ability to appeal to young progressive Jews. 
Changes in American politics have also encouraged some young Jewish Americans to 
critically engage with Israel through “Liberal Zionist” organizations or to engage in 
Palestinian Solidarity activism through “Anti-Occupation” organizations. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter responded to the longstanding debate among American Jewish 
intellectuals and community members surrounding whether young American Jews are 
distancing themselves from Israel or growing less attached. I have shown that a number 
of factors have led young Jews today to embrace a universalist vision of Judaism—a 
vision that is compatible with and motivates their liberal identities and tikkun olam 
actions. Young Jews not only grew up in a world vastly different than older generations 
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but also the position Israel holds on the international stage has evolved dramatically from 
an underdog to a powerful, and often aggressive, state. These interconnected factors 
make it highly unlikely that, with age, younger generations’ attachment to Israel will 
grow over time. Instead the impact of these factors, in conjunction with recent changes in 
American politics, requires further examination.  
Many American Jewish sociologists and political scientists have begun to 
recognize that changes are occurring and have questioned what this change looks like. 
This chapter presented three theories that seek to describe and understand how American 
Jewish life has changed: a growing culture of indifference surrounding Israel, engaging 
with Israel through criticism, or mobilizing against Israel for Palestinian Solidarity. Each 
of these theories is significant, painting just one part of a larger image of the many 
different reactions that have taken place. Despite different understandings of how 
American Jewish life is changing, all three theories to some extent—and especially Atalia 
Omer—recognize young Jews’ embrace of liberal values as central to transformations in 
Jewish attachment to Israel. In the chapters following, I depict how recent changes within 
American political life, specifically the rise of Trump, have impacted different segments 
of American Jewish life.  
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3 
Jewish Organizational Life 
Introduction 
To understand the changes within American Jewish life today, I examine Jewish 
organizational life and history to provide a context and background that helps depict the 
recent changes and the diversity of internal organizational responses. While this chapter 
begins by broadly discussing the vast number and diversity of American Jewish 
organizations, later I narrow in by delving deeper into organizations whose mission and 
purpose relates to Israel and/or the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. I present a framework of 
Israel-related American Jewish organizations to elucidate the similarities and differences 
between three groups of organizations. Each case study organization represents a larger 
group of similarly minded institutions, so this chapter presents the history and 
background of the three case study organizations—AIPAC, IfNotNow, and J Street—to 
set the stage for analysis within chapter four.  
Organizational Life 
American Jewish organizational life has a rich history and diversity, and today is 
made up of over 17,500 organizations (Barnett 2016, 40). Among these organizations are 
a broad spectrum of missions, purposes, members, and other distinguishing factors, 
providing spaces for the similarly diverse spectrum of American Jews’ political, 
religious, and cultural beliefs. One way to break down these organizations is to look at 
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the distinct purposes they serve in Jewish communities across America. Some 
organizations serve a primarily religious role, others provide volunteer opportunities, 
function as a cultural home, engage youth, or fight against anti-Semitism, among others.  
The American Jewish Yearbook (AJYB) serves as a helpful analytical tool, 
annually “document[ing] the institutional infrastructure of the North American Jewish 
community” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 579). The AJYM systematically categorizes 
the nearly 800 national Jewish organizations into 40+ categories: Denominational, Age-
Related (Adult, Youth, Children, and College Aged), Israel-Related Philanthropy-
Promoting, Holocaust, Academic, Fraternities/Sororities, National Origin, Social 
Welfare, among others (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 579-580). Although each 
organization is placed into a specific category, the editors’ note states that “many 
organizations could easily fit in multiple categories” and that the “inclusion of an 
organization does not imply that the editors share the viewpoints espoused by that 
organization” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 281).  
The editors’ note and the vast number overall of national organizations illustrates 
two trends in American Jewish life today. First, American Jewish organizations often 
play a multitude of roles in the lives of Jewish individuals. For example, a Jewish 
Denomination organization, like the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism or 
Union for Reform Judaism, often provides a space not only for prayer, but also engages 
its members in a wide range of cultural practices; it likely also promotes a particular set 
of beliefs and values around what it means to live a Jewish life, such as praying in 
Synagogue every Saturday or supporting Israel. Second, while there are an extensive 
number of organizations, some of these organizations are more or less accepted among 
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traditional and mainstream Jews and Jewish institutions. For example, mainstream 
organizations may reject the practices of newer and/or unconventional organizations, for 
they do not view these organizations practices or beliefs as essentially Jewish. Likewise, 
members of newer and/or unconventional organizations may similarly reject or criticize 
the practices of more traditional American Jewish organizations. This disagreement is 
part of a larger debate among American Jewish sociologists and scholars as to whether 
modern adaptations of traditional religious, cultural, and political modern are positive or 
negative changes. This lack of consensus is important to my research on American 
Jewish interest groups, for American Jews espouse conflicting beliefs as to whether the 
growing number of Israel-related interest groups, which disagree with traditional 
American Jewish institutions, are a beneficial development.  
Tradition versus Transformation 
The disagreement as to whether recent changes within American Jewish 
organizational life are positive or negative applies directly to my research question, 
informing much of the debate around whether the substance of American Jewish life is 
weakening or strengthening upon its encounter with the modern world. Over the last six 
years, far-left leaning groups have emerged that disagree with the views of traditional 
American Jewish interest groups who see supporting Israel as an essential Jewish 
practice. The growth or mobilization of these groups has sparked controversy 
surrounding what light to view these evolving and modern American Jewish practices. 
Later in this chapter, I present a framework that will depict how three different and 
disagreeing camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations promote either 
breaking or keeping with tradition.   
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Traditionalists and transformationalists disagree as to whether evolving Jewish 
life and practices to the modern world is good or bad. Traditionalists see the modern 
world as “inherently threatening to Judaism;” interactions with other cultures have led to 
new forms and practices that stray from or disagree with essential forms of Jewishness 
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). Meanwhile, transformationalists look more favorably 
on how the conditions of the modern world impacts Judaism, providing the opportunity 
for “developing new forms of Judaism and Jewishness” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 
10). These different world views mean that traditionalists and transformationalists 
“derive very different conclusions from the same facts” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 8). 
Transformationalists take an optimistic approach to changes in American Jewish life. For 
example, they do not see declines in Jewish involvement as a reason to worry; modern 
substitutes have replaced Jewish practices of the past provide an opportunity and thus are 
not a reason for despair. Meanwhile, traditionalists are worried when they see trends that 
Jews are “direction of less Jewish intensiveness, of greater integration into American 
society, and of more remoteness from other Jews, ritual practice, and organized Jewry” 
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). They believe pessimistically that trends of 
disengagement from traditional forms of Jewish organization and ritual practice 
constitute a threat to the authentic practice of Judaism. 
 The traditionalist and transformationalist interpretations provide a broader 
structure to understand disagreement among American Jews over how to approach the 
development of new organizations and forms of Jewish practice. Traditionalists would 
look negatively upon evidence of a diversifying body of organizations, whereas 
transformationalists would look optimistically upon these changes as an opportunity to 
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develop new Jewish practices and forms. My thesis specifically seeks to understand how 
recent changes in American political culture have affected American Jewish political life. 
The two interpretations of traditionalism and transformationalism are relevant to my 
research question, for they constitute the two opposing American Jewish reactions to 
evidence that American Jewish life today is evolving in response to changes stemming 
from the secular, outside world.  
Israel-related organizations 
 
This section narrows on Jewish Israel-related organizations within American 
Jewish life and presents a framework by which to categorize the growing diversity of 
organizations. When modern Jewish American pro-Israel interest groups were founded 
around the late 1960s there was very little diversity in viewpoints among these 
organizations. Over time, many new organizations were founded which espouse views 
that often disagreed with the more traditional and mainstream institutions by engaging 
more critically with Israel. This section discusses how these newer organizations differ 
from the older and traditional mainstream organizations. I then classify American Jewish 
Israel-related organizations into three categories.  
The mobilization and growth of newer organizations, particularly those on the far-
left who publicly criticize Israel, play an important role in shaping the power dynamic 
between American Jewish interest groups, challenging the power of the more traditional 
American Jewish establishment. Whereas transformationalists would look kindly upon 
these challenges to the status quo by new organizations who reform their practices to fit 
with the modern world, traditionalists would interpret challenge to traditional institutions 
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as “inherently threatening to Judaism” (Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 10). To understand 
how new organizations have questioned the status of quo of American Jewish policy on 
Israel, and the previously widespread consensus presented and promoted by 
establishment organizations, I have empirically chosen to map Israel-related 
organizations into three different categories. Within each category, I also present the 
background, history, issues, and strategies of a respective case study organization.  
The Erosion of Historical Consensus 
For the nearly 50 years since the 1967 war there was an apparent unanimity on 
Israel among the mainstream religious, cultural, and political American Jewish 
organizations. Following the 1967 war, “Israel was the great unifying cause of American 
Jewish politics,” bringing American Jews “physically and emotionally together” to march 
in the streets, fundraise, and lobby their elected officials in support of Israel (Waxman 
2016, 120). This sense of solidarity brought American Jews a sense of unity and purpose 
that reigned across their religious, cultural and political communities. The 1967 War also 
inspired a cultural transition among American Jews with Israel at the center. The sense of 
having almost lost Israel entirely and the pride over the Jewish state’s victory 
reconfigured the role of Israel in American Jewish identity. Saying the right things about 
Israel became an unofficial requirement for American Jews to be accepted members of 
the Jewish community (Liebman 1973, 92). 
One institution in particular, the Conference of Presidents of Major American 
Jewish Organizations (CoP), demonstrates how many organizations banded together to 
create an apparent consensus on Jewish issues and, more specifically, support for Israel. 
CoP encompasses fifty-one of the most prominent and powerful modern American 
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Jewish organizations, among which are the largest national, denominational Jewish 
organizations—the Orthodox Union, United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, and the 
Union for Reform Judaism (Conference of Presidents 2019). Since sixty-three percent of 
Jews today are denominationally Orthodox, Conservative or Reform, CoP therefore 
harnesses a large amount of power through its organizational members (Pew Research 
Center 2013, 10). The Conference also has member organizations whose primary 
purposes are not religious or cultural, but rather are to promote pro-Israel policies and 
strengthen the U.S. Israel relationship, such as the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee and the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA). While there has been some 
diversity of viewpoints among member organizations, CoP joined together and continues 
to unite member organizations to “advance the interests of the American Jewish 
community, sustain broad-based support for Israel and address the critical concerns 
facing world Jewry” (Conference of Presidents 2019). The larger institutions and many of 
its member organizations continue to maintain significant support today.  
While in the past Israel brought American Jews together, this phenomenon no 
longer holds today; the American Jewish community’s conversations around Israel—and 
particularly the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict—have grown increasingly divided. A new and 
rising group of American Jews have mobilized around their beliefs, questioning Israel’s 
actions within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leading to the creation of new organizations 
that then better represent their viewpoints. The existence and growth of these 
organizations (outside of the American Jewish establishment) call into question the 
previously accepted norms around Jewish unanimous support for Israel and the power of 
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establishment organizations to solely dictate American Jewish policy and public opinions 
regarding Israel. 
Mapping Organizations 
This section will define and analyze the difference and similarities between 
different camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations.3 There are a range of 
organizations that engage in many forms of Israel-related activities. The AJYB breaks 
down Israel-related organizations into five categories: (1) Education, (2) Humanitarian, 
(3) Political and Advocacy, (4) Supporting Specific Israeli Institutions, (5) and Other 
(Dashefsky and Sheskin 2019, 580). My analysis will look primarily at the 60 
organizations within the “Political and Advocacy” section as this directly relates to my 
research question surrounding how recent changes in American politics have impacted 
American Jews political stances and affected the representation of viewpoints within 
American Jewish interest groups.  
As I have developed in the following Table 2.1, American Jewish Political and 
Advocacy Israel-Related organizations can be roughly broken up into three different 
groups; each group upholds its own set of political beliefs, values, strategies, and 
missions. The three groups span a political spectrum of right- to left-leaning 
 
3 While some organizations do not necessarily describe themselves within their mission’s 
as ‘Jewish,’ I consider them as Jewish for several reasons. Sociologists include these 
organizations when categorizing the overall number of American Jewish organizations. 
The editors of the American Jewish Year Book ascribe AIPAC, J Street, INN within the 
Israel-related category of national American Jewish organizations. Moreover, both 
AIPAC and J Street are connected to CoP: AIPAC is a member; and J Street applied for 
membership yet was denied. As well, the vast majority of leadership, membership, 
donors, and their partners of these organizations describe themselves as Jewish. I will 
explore the explicitly Jewish nature, practices, and/or connections in the case study 
chapters.   
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organizations. The specific traits of each group are also not necessarily exclusive, 
particularly since the Liberal Zionist group’s beliefs, issues, and strategies exist 
somewhere along a spectrum between the “Establishment” and “Anti-Occupation” 
camps.  
Table 2.1: Mapping American Jewish Israel-Related Organizational Life: Three 
Camps on Advocacy and Politics 
 Political- 
leaning 
 
Example Zionism? Values: 
Universal  
or 
Particular?
4 
Who is at 
fault for 
beginning 
and/or 
perpetuatin
g the 
Israeli-
Palestinian 
Conflict? 
Public 
Jewish 
Criticism 
of Israel? 
ESTABL- 
ISHMENT 
Center-  
and  
far-right 
AIPAC Good Particular Palestine No 
LIBERAL 
ZIONISM 
Center- 
left 
J Street Good, as 
long as its 
liberal 
Both Israel and 
Palestine  
Yes 
ANTI- 
OCCUPAT
ION 
 
Far-left  
and 
progressive 
IfNotNow Bad or 
neutral 
Universal Israel Yes 
 
Table 2.1 is also broadly based upon Dov Waxman’s “The Four Camps in the 
American Jewish Debate about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” in Trouble in the Tribe 
 
4 The category that distinguishes between universal and particular values is based upon 
Michael Barnett’s explanation of trends in his book The Star and the Stripes. These 
differences are described in the interest group section of chapter. Particularism or 
“tribalism” understands the Jewish people as distinctly and uniquely situated in the 
world. Universalism rather promotes to an obligation to care for all people around the 
world, and not only other Jews.  
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(Waxman 2016, 94). I have made changes to Waxman’s table by adding additional 
distinguishing questions and renaming and consolidating organizational categories. 
Whereas Waxman includes a fourth “Far-Right” category separate from the “Right” 
camp, I have stylistically chosen not to distinguish between the two, as most of my 
analysis and research focuses on the growing differences and conflict between the right 
wing, center-left, and progressive organizations, and not between the Jewish center- and 
far-right groups. Throughout the next three sections I elucidate the differences between 
each group by presenting a case study organization that represents each camp.  
AIPAC and the Establishment 
The first group I will explore is the “Establishment” which is defined by its 
particularistic interpretation of Judaism and is drawn to a version of Zionism that 
recognizes the Jewish people’s unique connection to the land of Israel. Although 
internally members of establishment organizations are engaged in debate regarding Israeli 
politics, they also uphold clear ‘red lines’ leading them to reject organizations that 
publicly criticize Israel’s policies, such as actions that are antithetical peace, occupation, 
or treatment of the Palestinian people. With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
they do not believe Israel is at fault, but rather point to the violent actions of the 
Palestinians as responsible for undermining peace.5 AIPAC will serve as my case study 
for the American Jewish Establishment.  
 
5 Far-right wing organizations share similar beliefs to the center-right wing camp that the 
“predicament of Palestinians...is solely the fault of Palestinian and Arab leaders, for 
which Israel bears no responsibility” (Waxman 2016, 97). Nonetheless, the further right 
wing camp goes further than this to reject the Palestinian claim that they are the 
indigenous inhabitants of the land (Waxman 2016, 97).  
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AIPAC has played an important role in shaping modern U.S. policy on Israel. The 
organization was incorporated in 1963, fifteen years after the founding of the State of 
Israel (Bruck 2014, paragraph 20). AIPAC advocates for “security assistance to Israel and 
the development of cooperative missile defense programs with the United States, which 
allow Israel to defend herself by herself” (AIPAC 2020). When promoting the U.S.-Israel 
relationship, AIPAC conceives and presents this security relationship as a benefit to both 
parties: Israel and the United States of America (AIPAC 2020). The organization is a 
registered domestic lobby group that is supported by private contributions. Among the 
actions in AIPAC’s broader strategy are “initiating email campaigns, offering trips to 
Israel for politicians and community leaders, developing constituency groups that will 
contact their Senators and Congressmen, and providing educational programs” (Yoffee 
2014, paragraph 3).  
AIPAC’s activists point to the work they put into building relationships as 
responsible for their success (Stolberg 2019, paragraph 19). According to the Center for 
Responsive Politics, in 2018 AIPAC spent 3.5 million dollars on lobbying. Among older 
American Jews, donating to AIPAC is primarily a practice. As Beinart described, “the 
average large donor to a major American Jewish organization is in his fifties, sixties, or 
seventies” (Beinart 2012, 31). Although AIPAC does not donate to political campaigns, 
many of the organization’s financial supporters are also actively engaged in supporting 
candidates that support with their pro-Israel ideals (Stolberg 2019).  
AIPAC exists within two broader and overlapping structures: the ‘Israel Lobby’ 
and the American Jewish establishment (represented in the table). While these groups 
may overlap, there are distinct and important differences between the two that must be 
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recognized. The bounds and particular beliefs of the ‘Israel Lobby’ are debated and does 
include some diversity; this group broadly includes interest groups that support the 
political, military, and cultural relationship between the United and Israel. Some of the 
most powerful and prominent organizations within the Israel Lobby are AIPAC, the Anti-
Defamation League, the Conference of Presidents [of Major American Jewish 
Organizations], the Zionist Organization of America, and Christians United for Israel” 
(Mearsheimer 2017, paragraph 26). One important distinction between the ‘Israel Lobby’ 
and the American Jewish establishment is that the Israel Lobby also includes 
organizations that are not Jewish, like Christians United for Israel. AIPAC is also a 
widely discussed example of the Israel since is it is the “most powerful” and “best 
known” group about the “Israel Lobby” (Mearsheimer 2017, paragraph 26).  
One of the most important pieces of literature on the “Israel Lobby” and 
specifically AIPAC is John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s 2016 book The Israel 
Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that “the United States has a special relationship 
with Israel that has no parallel in modern history and it is almost wholly due to the lobby” 
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) (Mearsheimer 2017, under “John Mearsheimer”). The 
uniqueness of this relationship stems from unconditional support of the United States 
delivered through aid (Mearsheimer 2017, under “John Mearsheimer”). AIPAC and other 
organizations are criticized by opponents who argue that the Lobby controls U.S. foreign 
policy. Mearsheimer and Walt debate these misconceptions by illustrating that the Lobby 
functions “pretty much the same” as other powerful interest groups, like the National 
Rifle Association, the farm lobby, and many others. 
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Organizations within the Jewish establishment hold inherent differences from the 
Israel Lobby. Although they may espouse similar pro-Israel viewpoints to the Israel 
Lobby, many organizations’ fundamental purposes are not to promote the U.S.-Israel 
relationship, but rather to create a space for Jewish religious and cultural experiences. 
Organizations like AIPAC and the CoP exist at the intersection of both spaces, both 
within the broader structure of the American Jewish establishment and the American 
Israel Lobby. Moreover, although AIPAC is not Jewish, and therefore should not be 
understood as representing the views of the greater American Jewish population, Jews 
make up AIPAC’s “vital core” (Bruck 2014, paragraph 10). 
AIPAC today commands a large amount of power in Washington and is also 
highly organized across the United States. With 100,000 members, 17 regional offices, 
and "a vast pool of donors," AIPAC is a powerful actor that shapes American foreign 
policy on Israel (Bruck 2014, paragraph 10). The power of AIPAC (and other 
organizations within the Israel Lobby) has been widely discussed and is considered 
highly controversial. Nonetheless, AIPAC itself recognizes the power that it holds in 
Washington to shape U.S. policy on Israel. Connie Bruck, in her 2014 New Yorker 
article, asserts that AIPAC’s promotional literature describes how a reception during its 
annual policy conference “will be attended by more members of Congress than almost 
any other event, except for a joint session of Congress or a State of the Union address” 
(Bruck 2014, paragraph 2). However, AIPAC has not always been this powerful. 
Before the Six-day War AIPAC was still a rather small and unknown organization 
in Washington, DC. The Six-Day War and Israel’s subsequent victory was one of the 
most important moments in AIPAC’s history, for it emboldened the relationship between 
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American Jews and Israel as well as solidified the key political and cultural role that 
AIPAC played within this relationship. American Jewish support for Israel, through 
lobbying the U.S. Congress to provide Israel with military support, fostered a sense 
among American Jews that they were a part of Israel’s military victories. As Michael 
Barnett describes, American Jews garnered support in their unique ways, “Israel had F-
15s, America had the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and it was 
because of AIPAC that Israel had the F-15s. Israel and American Jews made a great 
team. At times, American Jews seemed to mistake Israel’s military feats for their own” 
(Barnett 2016, 163). As Israel grew central to the American Jewish identity, the cultural 
significance of AIPAC among American Jews also grew simultaneously. No longer just a 
Washington, DC lobby group, AIPAC became the “bellwether” of one’s Jewish identity 
(Barnett 2016, 164). For example, AIPAC’s annual Washington, DC Policy Conference 
became “something akin to High Holiday services for the Jewish political elite” (Barnett 
2016, 164).  
AIPAC’s narrative of ubiquitous support for Israel emphasizes a tribalistic 
understanding of the Jewish identity. As introduced in chapter 1, there are two different 
and opposing notions of Jewish identity—particularism/tribalism and 
universalism/cosmopolitanism, as described by Michael Barnett in The Star and the 
Stripes. The term particularism describes and defines “how Jews see themselves in 
relation to Gentiles, their obligations to those inside and outside the Jewish community, 
and their sense of the purpose of the world” (Barnett 2016, 7). Particularism emphasizes 
the notion of Jewish purpose and place in the world as Am Segulah, or “chosen people” 
(Barnett 2016, 7) Particularism is central to the AIPAC and American Jewish 
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establishment’s construction of Jewish identity, for they see the Jewish people as 
distinctly and uniquely situated in the world, both in terms of their historical experiences 
and connection to Israel. 
AIPAC connects the existence of Israel (and its personal role in promoting and 
preserving Israel’s security) to a broader narrative of Jewish peoplehood and their 
experiences as the eternal victim. AIPAC’s role in creating, maintaining, and promoting 
the United States’ political and military support for Israel has in turn led the organization 
to elevate the perception of their importance to the survival of the Jewish people. As 
Connie Bruck describes this phenomenon:  
AIPAC created an interesting mantra that they honestly believed: that, if AIPAC 
had existed prior to the Second World War, America would have stopped Hitler. 
It’s a great motivator, and a great fund-raiser—but I think it’s also AIPAC’s 
greatest weakness. Because if you convince yourself that, if only you had been 
around, six million Jews would not have been killed, then you sort of lose sight of 
the fact that the U.S. has its own foreign policy, and, while it is extremely friendly 
to Israel, it will only go so far (Bruck 2014). 
 
This narrative of victimhood is presented by the broader camp of the American 
Jewish establishment. This camp draws a connection between the biblical traumas, such 
as escaping oppression in Ancient Egypt, to those more recent, such as the Holocaust. For 
American Jews in this group, they connect the very founding and survival of Israel with 
freedom from ever again having to experience existential threats to their existence. 
Before the founding of the modern state of Israel, modern Jewish identity was predicated 
on the idea of exile within the diaspora. The re-establishment of a modern state of Israel 
in Jews biblical home therefore transformed the Jewish narrative from one of exile into 
one of redemption. The historical understanding of Jewish identity grounded in 
victimhood shapes how the pro-Israel camp sees physical and political attacks on Israel 
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today. Whether it is violent uprisings against the Israeli military or a peaceful protest 
from the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, the pro-Israel camp connects 
these incidents to the long history of anti-Semitism and Jewish victimhood. Pro-Israel 
groups will thus delegitimize beliefs that run counter to a particularistic narrative of 
Judaism, connecting the historical and biblical connections to Israel and the unique 
experiences of victimhood with the importance of Israel today.   
J Street and Liberal Zionism 
The “Liberal Zionist” group spans the two visions of modern Judaism--
Universalism and Particularism—pushing the group to embrace not only the ancient 
Jewish unique connection to the land of Israel, but also the cosmopolitan values of social 
justice and care for all human beings. As a result of these competing values, 
organizations within the “Liberal Zionist camp” uphold a vision of Israel that is driven by 
both liberal, democratic values and a recognition of the place as the eternal Jewish 
national homeland. These two visions lead the center-left camp to publicly question both 
the Israeli and Palestinian’s governments actions that defy peace and a future two-state 
solution, while simultaneously affirming and supporting the Israel’s right to exist as 
Jewish state.  
While the Liberal Zionism group may often have overlapping interests, values, or 
beliefs to the two other groups, there are clear red lines that Establishment and Anti-
Occupation organizations uphold that separate Liberal Zionist organizations from these 
two other camps. While in the past Liberal Zionist organizations were regarded as beyond 
the pale of acceptance and normalcy for establishment organizations, these red lines have 
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begun to evolve, allowing these center-left organizations to slowly grow to become more 
normalized and accepted by some mainstream American Jews. 
 The case study organization that represents the “Liberal Zionist” is J Street, an 
organization that was founded in 2007 to “serve as the political home and voice for pro-
Israel, pro-peace Americans” (J Street 2020). The founder and president of J Street 
Jeremy Ben Ami describes how he created J Street to provide a “moderate voice”—a 
voice that he believes has been “drowned out” by “the loudest eight percent” of American 
Jews who are the most vocal, single-minded, right-wing, and uncritical in their support 
for Israel (Jeremy Ben-Ami, A New Voice for Israel, 94–95). He believed that the 
viewpoint his organization presents—of supporting Israel while allowing for criticism of 
it—would better represent the majority of Jewish Americans. This viewpoint greatly 
differs from the policies of establishment organizations like AIPAC who yield 
unwavering support for Israel irrespective of the extent to which the nation takes actions 
following democratic values, particularly in its treatment of the Palestinian people. Ben-
Ami saw the vast amount of power that AIPAC wielded in Washington, DC among 
political actors, and therefore he envisioned creating an organization that would “give 
cover to Democrats to get tough on Israel and pressure them to make a deal with 
Palestinians” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 5). 
J Street is part of a group of other left-leaning organizations engaged in promoting 
a two-state solution. On June 24, 2019, ten leading organizations—Ameinu, Americans 
for Peace Now, Hashomer Hatzair, The Jewish Labor Committee, J Street, The New 
Israel Fund, Partners for Progressive Israel, Reconstructing Judaism, and T’ruah—united 
to create the Progressive Israel Network Organizations. As Reconstructing Judaism 
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describes, the network will “provide a strong, unified voice in support of its members’ 
common goals: democracy and equal rights, religious freedom and pluralism, and a two-
state solution that would secure a peaceful future for Israel and end the 52-year-long 
occupation” (Reconstructing Judaism 2019, paragraph 4). These organizations seek better 
representation and recognition among mainstream American Jewish institutions. The 
Progressive Israel Network will, for example, run for a joint list in the World Zionist 
Congress to ensure that institutions will “reflect our values” (Reconstructing Judaism 
2019, paragraph 3). 
While J Street was not the first organization to seek to change the status quo to 
embrace both liberal and pro-Israel values, seeking to shape the narrative around Israel 
within American politics and across American Jewish political life, the organization has 
been by far one of the most successful among other like-minded organizations. J Street’s 
founder describes how he views it as a victory that there is now a growing awareness of 
the diversity of opinions among American Jews: 
Five years ago [before J Street was founded] there was no sense in this town that 
there were two points of view in the Jewish community. Today I would say that 
eighty percent of people in this town are aware that there is a division in the 
Jewish community on this issue [the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. Just awareness 
of the existence of diversity of debate is a huge victory (quoted in Waxman 2016, 
179).  
 
J Street’s actions that seek to change the narrative around Israel is not about telling 
people exactly what to believe, but rather is about “trying to redefine what it means to be 
pro-Israel. You don’t have to be noncritical. You don’t have to adopt the party line. It’s 
not, ‘Israel, right or wrong’” (Traub 2009, paragraph 2). 
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The organization has grown successfully since its founding in 2007. During J 
Street’s first few years, it went from “being a small start-up (with only four full-time staff 
members) to becoming a major player in the pro-Israel lobby (with a staff of fifty). J 
Street’s operating budget increased from roughly $1.5 million in 2008 to almost $7 
million in 2013” (quoted in Waxman 2016, 164). As of 2019, J Street has a $10 million 
annual budget (Saleh and Grim 2019, section “equal opportunity boss”). The organization 
today also commands a large membership of “well over 100,000 supporters” (Waxman 
2016, 164). J Street has also showed increasing growth at its annual national conferences; 
“1,500 people attended its first conference in October 2009, which featured a keynote 
speech by then U.S. national security adviser James L. Jones. By the time of its fourth 
conference, in 2013, there were more than 2,800 attendees, and speeches by U.S. Vice 
President Joe Biden, U.S. Middle East envoy Martin Indyk, and Israel’s then minister of 
justice and lead peace negotiator Tzipi Livni” (Waxman 2016, 165). 
The growth of J Street, in drawing attention to the diversity of beliefs on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict among American Jews, has also illustrated that groups like 
AIPAC do not speak for all Jewish Americans. The name of the group fits in with this 
vision of fulfilling a role that didn’t previously exist. As the 2019 article in “The 
Intercept” describes, the group chose to name itself “J Street” as because “there is no J 
Street in the city, and this new group aimed to be something new under the Washington 
sun” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 7). The founder of the organization has played 
such a central role since the beginning that the “joke inside J Street is that the “J” now 
stands for “Jeremy” (Saleh and Grim 2019, paragraph 7). 
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While J-street’s target audience are “pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans who want 
Israel to be secure, democratic and the national home of the Jewish people,” they work 
actively with and for American Jewish communities whose voices were previously 
“underrepresented and ignored in our politics” (J Street 2019, under “What we do”). In J 
Street’s paperwork when they filed for non-profit status, the organization best described 
mobilization and action strategy: “by educating, organizing and mobilizing the large 
segment (81 percent) of American Jews who support strong U.S. leadership for a two-
state solution, we can provide the space and support the president and policy makers need 
to boldly help Israelis and Palestinians resolve their conflict” (GuideStar 2006, under 
“Charting Impact”). 
J Street has embraced an organizing strategy that advocates and engages 
individuals on every level—"in Washington, in political campaigns, in our communities 
and on campuses” (J Street 2020, under “What we do”). Through J Street U, the student 
organizing arm of J Street, the organization engages students, trains campus leadership, 
and fosters a community of young people interested in changing campus dialogue around 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (J Street U 2020). Meanwhile, JStreetPAC was established 
in 2008 as the “first-ever federal political action committee (PAC) to explicitly 
promote American leadership to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (J Street Pac 
2020). The PAC has the goal of demonstrating that there is a “depth and breadth of 
political support” for candidates that favor a “diplomacy-first approach to advancing US 
interests in the Middle East and promoting peace and security for Israel” (J Street Pac 
2020). J Street’s campus organizing arm and affiliated PAC allow it to attack its mission 
of changing the national conversation and create the political space for pro-Israel and 
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pro-Peace policies. Whereas the former provides it the tools to promote activism and 
organizing among young people on this issue, the latter seeks to ensure that the people 
who will support their goals are granted a position of power.  
The growth of J Street has called into question the power of AIPAC. J street has 
only a “tiny fraction of AIPAC’s financial power and influence on Capitol Hill,” yet as 
Connie Bruck describes J Street has tried to “provide at least some campaign funding to 
weaken the lobby’s grip” (Bruck 2014, paragraph 55). Despite J Street being founded to 
provide an alternative to AIPAC and its success in challenging the prior status quo, the 
organization denies that it has any intention to compete with AIPAC. In one interview for 
example, Ben-Ami describes that “we [ J Street] are not, in any way, in opposition to 
AIPAC. In fact, we want to work with them on much of what they do” (quoted in 
Waxman 2016, 267). However, Waxman denotes a contradictory statement by Ben-Ami 
during an author interview in 2011 saying that “just getting members of Congress to say 
no when AIPAC calls is the first step” (quoted in Waxman 2016, 267). Waxman also 
describes the implications of “J Street’s rapid expansion and growing political activism” 
as “not only challenged AIPAC, but also undoubtedly contributed—for better or for 
worse (depending on your point of view)—to the further splintering of the pro-Israel 
lobby” (Waxman 2016, 148). By “splintering of the pro-Israel lobby,” Waxman is 
referring to the increasing fragmentation and political division within the Israel Lobby as 
a result of being challenged by contradictory viewpoints, particularly from increasingly 
powerful American Jewish institutions, like J Street.  
The American Jewish establishment has resisted changes to accepted viewpoints 
around Israel stemming from Liberal Zionist organizations like J Street. One clear 
 
 
 63 
occasion of when the establishment upheld very clear red lines was when the Conference 
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (CoP) denied J Street membership 
to the Conference in 2014. This significant and recent example of denying J Street from 
joining a prominent body of powerful American Jewish by a wide margin illustrates the 
American Jewish establishment’s continuous resistance to groups that criticize Israel. J 
Street responded to its denied entry by arguing that it reaffirms their reasoning for 
existing: that the Jewish establishment claims to “speak for the entire Jewish 
community,” yet they do not “in fact represent the full diversity of pro-Israel views in 
[the Jewish and broader American] community” (Black 2014, paragraph 4). 
IfNotNow and Anti-Occupation Activism 
 The “Anti-Occupation” group is defined by a universalist vision of Judaism that 
compels American Jews to stand up against actions that support the Israeli occupation. 
This means that these organization disagree with and criticize not only Israel’s actions 
that deliberately undermine the freedom and dignity of Palestinians but also the actions of 
the American Jewish community, and particularly the Jewish establishment, that support 
Israel. The “Anti-Occupation” camp focuses specifically on Israel’s role in perpetuating 
the conflict by occupying the Palestinian territories. They support actions that lead to the 
“shared humanity and full equality of Palestinians and Israelis alike” (Dashefsky and 
Sheskin 2019, 639). The American Jewish Establishment views these “Anti-Occupation” 
groups as ‘beyond the pale’ of acceptance and describe such groups as “self-hating 
Jews.” Although the “Anti-Occupation” and “Liberal Zionist” groups at times uphold 
similar opinions, there are clear red lines between these groups; for example, whereas the 
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former upholds either negative or neutral beliefs about Zionism, the latter outwardly 
expresses and celebrates Zionism. IfNotNow (INN) is an important example of an anti-
occupation Jewish group that has gained traction and significant attention since its 
founding.  
INN was founded during the midst of the 2014 Israel-Gaza war also known as 
Operation Protective Edge. Mainstream American Jewish institutions, like AIPAC, 
responded to this violence by mourning the lives of Israelis lost or put in danger and 
supporting the Israeli government’s aggressive tactics to quell Palestinian violence in 
Gaza and the West Bank. Instead, this group of American Jews came together to “honor 
the loss of both Israeli and Palestinian life” (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow 
Began & Our Strategy). Across nearly a dozen cities American Jews joined together in 
protest. They said the Mourner’s Kaddish, the Jewish prayer in honor of the deceased, for 
both Palestinians and Israeli lives lost. The protestors presented three demands, “Stop the 
War on Gaza, End the Occupation, and Freedom and Dignity for All;” these demands 
would later inform INN’s mission (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow Began & Our 
Strategy). The protestors’ recognition of the Palestinian narrative and suffering stands in 
stark contrast to Jewish establishment organizations who blame the Palestinians and 
interpret these acts of violence within the constructs of terrorism.  
Since the start of INN’s movement, the organization has constructed its practices 
and values around Jewish ritual, traditions, languages, and practices (IfNotNow 2020, 
under “Our Principles”). INN’s protests have continuously incorporated Jewish elements 
and have made Jewish songs and teachings central to their protest of American Jewish 
support of the Occupation. The group’s name is also founded in Jewish tradition. They 
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united around the name, “If Not Now, When?” in 2014 (that would later become 
IfNotNow). This phrase originates from a well-known saying by the 1st century Jewish 
teacher Hillel the Elder: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And being for 
myself, what am 'I'? If not now, when?" (Blumberg 2014, paragraph 3).  
INN’s mission spans both American politics in general as well as American 
Jewish institutions with the goal of reorienting policies regarding Israel around liberal 
values, including justice. As INN’s website describes, “on the one hand, we are part of 
the ubiquitous American project, taking action so all can be equal. And on the other, we 
embrace our uniquely Jewish identity, as we sit down to shabbat dinner or sit in at ICE 
detention centers” (IfNotNow 2020, under “United and clear-eyed, we are the majority 
and the future of our community”). Today, the organization is working toward two 
interrelated goals: to end Israel’s occupation and to transform the American Jewish 
community to represent their values of justice and dignity (IfNotNow 2020, under “Who 
We Are”).   
After the 2014 war in Gaza ended, the leaders of these protests sought to cultivate 
a widespread American Jewish movement centered around ending the occupation of 
Palestinians and standing for the freedom and dignity of both Palestinians and Israelis. 
They joined the Momentum organizing community, a training institute and movement 
incubator that has had participants across many other significant and recent movement-
building groups, including Black Lives Matter, Dream Defenders, BYP100, United We 
Dream, Showing Up For Racial Justice, 350.org, National People’s Action, PICO, and 
more” (Momentum Community 2020, under “What does Momentum teach?”). The 
organization thus upholds a grassroots structure of organizing and grew alongside a 
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cohort of other significant liberal movements, many of which gained momentum in 
response to the rise of Donald Trump. INN believes in Momentum’s organizational 
strategy that change will happen when there is either 3.5 % active support or 50% passive 
support for their cause; INN approximates this to support from 180,000 American Jews 
actively or 3 million Jewish passively (IfNotNow 2018). 
After joining Momentum organizing community, IfNotNow has grown 
exponentially from a small group of American Jews concerned with the “hawkish 
response of American Jewish institutions” towards the violence of Operation Protective 
Edge into a vibrant grassroots social movement working across sixteen cities in the 
United States and Canada (IfNotNow 2020, under “How IfNotNow Began & Our 
Strategy”). Between 2016 and 2018, IfNotNow hosted more than 350 protests, 
cumulatively engaging 10,000 people (Brinley 2018, paragraph 23). As of 2019, INN had 
“trained an estimated 1,675 people, drawn countless more sympathizers and casual 
supporters, and become a formidable opponent to the right and center-left” (Reisman 
2019, paragraph 10). 
INN’s organizing beliefs are based around a social view of power in which people 
exist at the top and “have the power” and the power holders exist at the bottom 
(IfNotNow 2018). Instead of leaders dictating to individuals the organization’s beliefs, 
the people hold their leaders accountable. Through this strategy, INN has focused their 
efforts on gaining support from the public—the mainstream American Jewish 
community—rather than meeting with existing community leadership (or the boards of 
American Jewish Establishment organizations). As INN describes in their training 
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materials for new activists, “sustainable change will only happen if we create a cultural 
change in our community” and then leadership will follow (IfNotNow 2018).  
The organization’s national organizing structure of “Support and Coordination” 
aligns with their vision of employing grassroots activism to dismantle existing systems of 
power. This system of organizing has likely been an important factor in leading to the 
INN’s success in mobilizing young American Jews and quickly growing their 
organization. INN’s national organizing structure features regional “Hives” that bring 
together activists within local groups. Each Hive has a set of teams, with several teams 
focused on particular tasks; for example, each local Hive has an ‘actions team’ and a 
‘communications team.’ Within each team, there are two coaches or “spokes” that 
“support and participate in local teams, share lessons and coordinate across cities, decide 
on national proposals with advice from their local teams, and run regular local team 
organization trainings” (INN Training Materials, “National Structure - Support and 
Coordination,” 2019). Then, each of these specific regional teams unite form a “Hub” 
that brings together other teams fulfilling the same role from other cities, such as 
Actions/Communication Hub (INN Training Materials). This organizational structure 
inherently creates routes for regional and national cooperation and open lines of 
communication, as well as encourages growth of local-level leaders through coaches and 
spokes. The grassroots structure has helped the organization gain Jewish members and 
leaders from diverse backgrounds, as well as aided and accelerated its growth across 
several cities. 
INN has made strides in moving forward with their four-phase plan to transform 
the American Jewish community. According to their four-phase plan the group must first 
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be united, build a foundation, and then show itself as a growing social movement. Next, 
the young generation must take action and show that they stand for freedom and dignity 
for both Palestinians and Israelis. Third, they must expose the moral crisis through 
showing that people across generations concerned and taking action in unprecedented 
numbers. Finally, they seek to shift the majority of US Jewish community (INN Training 
Materials). INN is currently in the second phase of mobilization—appealing to young 
American Jews who are outraged by the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
their own community’s response to this violence. INN’s materials describe their two 
target constituencies as millennial liberals and young Jewish leaders involved in Jewish 
institutions—or, in simpler terms “engaged Jews looking for a political home & activists 
looking for a Jewish home” (INN Training Materials). As a result, their current actions to 
mobilize young Jewish Americans and to depict themselves as an important force to be 
reckoned with should be understood as part of a broader, consecutive, and ongoing 
strategy to transform American Jewish institutions’ policies regarding Israel.  
INN exists as part of a group of progressive American Jewish organizations 
related to Israel and the conflict that seeks to end the Occupation, promote the dignity and 
rights of both Israeli and Palestinians, and conduct social justice work. Among 
organizations within this group are Jewish Voices for Peace (JVP), New Israel Fund, 
T’ruah. Founded in 1996, JVP has been engaged in this issues much longer than INN and 
embraces similar goals through their focus on seeking “an end to the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem; security and self-determination for 
Israelis and Palestinians; a just solution for Palestinian refugees based on principles 
established in international law; an end to violence against civilians; and peace and 
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justice for all peoples of the Middle East” (Jewish Voice for Peace 2020, under 
“Mission”). However, these two groups differ in their approach to presenting positions 
controversial issues. INN does not take a stand on the Boycott, Divestment, and 
Sanctions “(BDS) movement, political Zionism, or a 1- or 2- state solution to the 
conflict” (Wyron 2017, 5). Meanwhile, JVP supports the BDS movements and 
“unequivocally oppose[s] Zionism” (Jewish Voice for Peace 2020, under “Our Approach 
to Zionism”). INN’s choice not to take a stand on these issues make it unique from other 
American Jewish leftist organizations working on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As 
described in a 2019 New York Magazine profile, INN’s refusal to answer certain 
questions regarding issues is a helpful strategy by “uniting people” with a broader set of 
beliefs, joining together those who are Zionist and anti-Zionist, as well as supporters and 
opponents of BDS (Reisman 2019, paragraph 12). Nonetheless, the lack of clear 
viewpoints on controversial issues has incited criticism from opponents who say that “it 
hasn’t articulated and agreed upon what it’s for so much as what it’s against” (Reisman 
2019, paragraph 34). 
Besides “Anti-Occupation” organizations, INN also exists within a broader 
network of American Jewish organizations working to secure and promote progressive 
causes in the United States, such as Bend the Arc and Jews for Racial & Economic 
Justice. This group of organizations are not specifically focused on the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict, but rather are oriented around social justice. They draw upon Jewish values like 
tikkun olam to motivate their activism for liberal causes. 
INN’s relationship to liberal “Liberal Zionist” or “Establishment” organizations is 
shaped by the fact that many of its activists were previously affiliated members or leaders 
 
 
 70 
within these other organizations. For example, IfNotNow co-founder Simone 
Zimmerman was previously the national president of J Street U, the campus arm of J 
Street. She ultimately felt that J Street was not “radical enough” for her beliefs, especially 
after J Street expressed unanimous support for Israel during the 2014 war (Reisman 2019, 
Section 2). J Street does not necessarily see the growth of organizations to its left as 
negative, and Ben-Ami even told the writers of a New York Magazine article “The 
Jewish Revolt” that he finds IfNotNow “really exciting” (Reisman 2019, paragraph 11). 
Zimmerman’s story is not unique, and many of IfNotNow’s members were 
previously affiliated in the American Jewish Establishment or other Liberal 
organizations. As the New York Post profile of INN describes, “Zimmerman’s story is 
echoed in those of so many IfNotNow members. Time and again, I spoke to Jewish 20- 
and (to a lesser extent) 30-somethings who were raised in the Reform or Conservative 
denominations and remain as passionate about the Jewish community and Jewish practice 
as they are newly critical of its institutions” (Reisman 2019, Section 2). These prior 
personal relationships among members, particularly with “Establishment” organizations, 
have shaped INN’s mission to “transform the American Jewish community” to reflect 
their Jewish values (IfNotNow 2019, under “Who We Are”). INN’s #YouNeverToldMe 
campaign depicts this complicated relationship with Jewish Establishment organizations, 
calling upon “Jewish summer camp, day school, and youth group alumni who grew up in 
institutions that ignored or justified the Occupation” to share their experiences and ask 
their “institutions to provide Jewish education that advances freedom and dignity for all 
people” (You Never Told Me 2020).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter provides a framework to understand the three primary groups of 
American Jewish organizations engaged in Israel- and Conflict-related work. These three 
groups—the “Establishment,” “Liberal Zionist,” and “Occupation” groups—exist on a 
spectrum, and the “Liberal Zionist” category shares some similarities with both groups. 
However, some fundamental differences separate these camps of organizations, often 
leading to conflict  
The founding, growth, and increasing normalization of organizations in the 
“Liberal Zionist” and “Anti-Occupation” camps questions the power of the establishment 
to shape the narrative over Jewish support for Israel both internally and outside of the 
Jewish community. The traditionalist and transformationalist differences apply to the 
American Jewish divide over Israel, impacting how one perceives changes to Jewish 
attachments to Israel. Traditionalists look negatively upon changes to the status quo 
around Jewish attachment to Israel, such as the growth of “Liberal Zionist” and “Anti-
Occupation” groups, and seek to preserve consensus support for Israel; 
Transformationalists would instead view these changes in a more hopeful light as an 
opportunity to develop new forms of Jewishness and Jewish practice in the modern 
world. 
The next chapter discusses how changes in American politics since 2016 have 
impacted the three camps of American Jewish Israel-related organizations in a variety of 
ways. I depict the role of changes that American politics played in effecting American 
Jewish life through exploring its unique impact on each of my three case study 
organizations. 
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4 
Post-2016 American Jewish Politics 
Introduction 
My thesis seeks to understand to what extent fundamental changes in American 
politics have affected American Jewish interest groups and public opinions. To measure 
these effects, I have chosen to look particularly at American Jewish organizations that are 
Israel-related. The changes within these interest groups are at the epicenter of broader 
changes to American Jewish political life and help to illuminate the growing changes in 
political sentiment and mobilization among American Jews today. These changes should 
not be understood as the sole result of changes in American politics. Rather, American 
political rifts and movements since 2016 have furthered previously existing internal 
trends in American Jewish life, such as growing rates of intermarriage, different 
generational experiences, and the diverging politics of Israel and American Jews as 
discussed in chapter 2. The development of these trends has led to an increase in internal 
polarization and political mobilization.  
This chapter will explore how phenomena resulting from the 2016 election—the 
rise of Trump, challenges to bipartisanship, and growing rifts within the Democratic 
Party between leftist and progressive factions—have directly impacted American Jewish 
interest group representation and mobilization on the issue of Israel, particularly as it 
relates to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After describing these phenomena and their 
relation to politics in Israel and the U.S.-Israeli relationship, I analyze their connection to 
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recent internal changes within my three case study organizations. Through examining 
AIPAC, IfNotNow, and J Street’s internal challenges or mobilization since 2016, I 
illustrate how changes within American Jewish Israel-politics were advanced through 
fundamental changes in American politics. 
The Rise of Trump, Political Polarization, and Democratic Party Rifts 
The 2016 election sparked substantial changes within American politics and 
political culture. Although political polarization and the growth of progressive 
movements in America had already begun during the prior years of President Obama, this 
election was monumental and furthered existing political divisions across America. The 
following sections explore how the rise of Donald Trump during the 2016 election, with 
his untraditional rhetoric, values, and presidency, advanced the already existing 
polarization between Republicans and Democrats. Trump’s discussion and 
implementation of policies that undermined minority rights stimulated progressive groups 
to take immediate action and rally for the rights of women, undocumented immigrants, 
women, and LGBTQ people among others; progressive mobilization into counter protests 
contributed to the growth of the progressive wing of the Democratic party in the years 
following Trump’s election. These trends in American political culture directly impacted 
individuals and political actors across America. American Jewish politics is just one 
example of many groups that was affected.  
Before the 2016 election, pertinent political divides existed in Jewish America—
divides that ebbed and flowed depending upon the political circumstances of the time in 
the United States and Israel. Nonetheless, the rise of President Donald Trump in 2016 
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catalyzed fundamental changes in American politics that protruded American Jewish life. 
For Democrats, the 2016 election cultivated significant political mobilization on social 
justice issues. American Jews similarly became swept up in these social justice 
movements. They joined causes relevant to their Jewishness—including promoting 
Israeli-Palestinian peace and fighting the recent upsurge in anti-Semitism and white 
nationalism—along with many secular causes, such as protecting undocumented 
immigrants and protesting for women’s rights. As a result, the larger transformations 
within American political life shaped and informed the causes and the representation of 
viewpoints across American Jewish interest groups, leading to mobilization and 
polarization. 
Political Polarization 
Political polarization, or the vast and growing gap between Republicans and 
Democrats, has become a “defining feature of American politics today” (Pew Research 
Center, “Political Polarization”). As liberals’ and conservatives’ viewpoints move further 
apart on the political spectrum, Americans’ willingness to listen to disagreeing 
viewpoints have diminished. Americans that hold views from opposing ends of the 
political spectrum also exist in separate political ‘bubbles,’ reading dissimilar new 
sources, socializing with groups of like-minded individuals, and following accounts on 
social media that espouse similar views. This has led to the erosion of interactions 
between individuals with viewpoints from different ends of the political spectrum, 
impacting how American political organizations operate and decreasing everyday 
Americans’ willingness to cooperate, as well as political actors’ bipartisanship, such as in 
Congress. 
 
 
 75 
While Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election was in many ways a product 
of the already existing polarization in the United States, his presidency has continuously 
played into, and increased, partisan divides. One illustration of the growing polarization 
was Trump’s approval ratings from his third year in office; “eighty-two percentage points 
separated Republicans’ (89%) and Democrats’ (7%) average job approval ratings” (Jones 
2020, paragraph 1).  As Jeffrey Jones describes in Gallup, this is the “largest degree of 
political polarization in any presidential year measured by Gallup, surpassing the 79-
point party gap in Trump's second year in office” (Jones 2020, paragraph 1). 
The issue of Israel has also not remained separate from the growing partisanship 
in the United States. As Martin Indyk, a former ambassador to Israel under President Bill 
Clinton, described “this split between Republicans and Democrats on Israel is real and is 
mirrored in a split between the government of Israel and the American Jewish 
community” (Stolberg 2019). According to a 2018 poll by Pew Research Center, the 
partisan divide over American support for Israel was at its “widest in four decades, with 
79 percent of Republicans sympathizing with Israel in its dispute with the Palestinians, 
versus 27 percent of Democrats” (quoted in Stolberg 2019) (Pew Research Center 2018). 
Although 70% of American Jews identify as Democrats, American Jewish Republicans 
are much more likely to see caring about Israel as an essential part of being Jewish (Pew 
Research Center 2013). The rise of Trump has furthered these existing challenges to 
bipartisanship, putting American Jewish organizations and individuals who support Israel 
in a difficult place. Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld, who leads Ohev Sholom, an Orthodox 
congregation in Washington, D.C., describes how Trump’s alignment with Israel is in 
some ways “very dangerous” (Lerer and Diaz 2019, paragraph 7). Rabbi Herzfeld said 
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that “if Israel equals Trump, then there is a concern that opposition to Trump will 
transition, God forbid, into opposition to Israel” (Lerer and Diaz 2019, paragraph 7). 
Israel’s internal politics is similarly divided between two polls with increasingly 
right-wing leadership, as represented by current Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s 
right-wing Likud Party and Benny Gantz’ central and liberal political alliance Blue and 
White. Under the leadership of Netanyahu, Israel has moved further to the right and has 
undertaken blatantly discriminatory policies against Palestinians as well as the non-
Jewish Arab citizens. The 2018 nation-state law in particular illustrates this right-ward 
movement by “legally enshrining Israel’s Jewish character” at the expense of minority 
groups living in the nation (Badie 2019).  
As Israel moves further to the right, the “Netanyahu-Republican Alliance has only 
strengthened” (Stolberg 2019). The growing alliance between Trump and Netanyahu 
serves to benefit both leaders in their re-election campaigns. Martin S. Indyk described 
that “you have a situation where Netanyahu is relying on Trump to help him in his re-
election, and Trump is expecting Netanyahu to reciprocate” (Stolberg 2019). The 
relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu “could not be 
better,” for Trump has served as a reliable ally for Netanyahu’s most controversial 
policies, such as recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a disputed 
territory (Badie 2019). Netanyahu has reciprocated appreciation for Trump by, for 
example, naming a new town after Trump in June 2019 (Stolberg 2019).  
The polarizing and controversial nature of Trump’s presidency throughout the 
United States, and Trump’s explicit alignment with right wing forces within Israel, has 
created unique challenges for American Jews. The sections following depict how 
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Trump’s election and support for Israel has contributed to polarization and challenges to 
bipartisanship for American Jews on the issue of Israel.  
Democratic Party Rifts 
A big split has also emerged within the Democratic party that is characterized by 
an ideological divide between progressive and moderate camps. The differences between 
these two factions grew especially apparent during the 2020 Democratic Party debates. 
Progressive candidates like Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Elizabeth Warren stood 
in stark contrast to moderate Democratic candidates like Vice President Joe Biden and 
Mayor Pete Buttigieg. These groups represent separate ideological factions within the 
Democratic party. The trend of support for these different candidates and visions of the 
Democratic party is also generational skewed with younger democrats embracing a more 
progressive vision of party politics. 
This progressive-left divide has had noticeable effects on American Jews today, 
the vast majority of whom lean Democrat. Alisson Summers describes in Haaretz how 
focusing only on the left-right polarization narrative “distracts from a second and more 
complicated divide: A growing political and generational split within the Democratic 
liberal American-Jewish majority” (Summers 2019). As identified in Chapter 2, 
generational divides have not only pervaded the Democratic party, but also American 
Jewish life. Older and younger generations of Jewish Americans have had fundamentally 
different Jewish and Israel experiences that have led younger generations to orient their 
values around social justice and progressive causes, while older generations instead 
remain more attached to particularistic values that lead them to unequivocally support 
Israel. Aaron David Miller, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
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Peace and expert on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, connects the “deepening generational 
divide in the Democratic Party” to generational differences among American Jews 
(Stolberg 2019). For example, whereas young, progressive Jews protested outside of 
AIPAC’s policy conference, “older Democrats like Ms. Pelosi and Representative Steny 
H. Hoyer, the majority leader, address[ed] delegates inside” (Stolberg 2019). 
Since the 2016 election, the discourse within the Democratic Party on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has changed. Phyllis Bennis’ article “The 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Campaign: Changing Discourse on Palestine” argues that although “both major political 
parties and both likely candidates ended up situated within or just to the right of the 
standard U.S. pro-Israel policy positions,” discourse regarding Israel-Palestine was “on 
the Democratic table for the first time in decades, to be debated and discussed as a 
legitimate campaign issue” (Bennis 2016, 35). Bernie Sanders rise in the Democratic 
Primaries, and his willingness to openly critique Israeli policy, therefore challenging 
existing taboos that prevented speaking out against pro-Israel policies and the Israel 
Lobby, was certainly important (Bennis 2016, 35). However, one new aspect of this 
election was the existence of “some actual discussion and real disagreements among 
politicians” on important U.S.-Israel policy issues, such as the legality of settlements, the 
amount of U.S. military aid to Israel, and Israel’s use of force during the 2014 war 
between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (Bennis 2016, 38). Bennis’ article shows that although 
the party leaders—Clinton and Trump—remained committed to traditional standpoints on 
Israel, this election represented a turning point in how the Democratic party approached 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict through eroding the existence or appearance of unanimity 
over support for Israel, especially among progressive politicians. Since the 2016 election, 
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this trend of increasing criticism of Israel among Democratic party leaders and 
politicians, and particularly those who subscribe to progressive ideals has continued, 
creating a splintering among progressive and leftist leaders. 
Case Study Analysis 
The First Encounter 
When Trump first joined the stage at AIPAC’s annual policy conference (PC) in 
Washington, DC in 2016, many were unsure of what sort of welcome the controversial 
candidate would receive. A highly important event for those tuned into Israel politics, the 
conference typically features keynote speeches by American political leaders from across 
the political spectrum, along with Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, with the goal of educating and inspiring participants, garnering donations, 
and promoting the U.S.-Israel partnership. With over 18,000 attendees, this annual event 
serves as the largest gathering of America’s pro-Israel community, among which are 
thousands of American Jewish adults. The annual conference has invited and hosted both 
Democratic and Republican presidential primary candidates across several election. That 
year, 2016, AIPAC invited all of the major parties’ presidential candidates to speak to 
their delegation. 
AIPAC’s announcement that, then presidential candidate, Donald Trump would 
join to address AIPAC’s Policy Conference spurred widespread conversation among 
event attendees regarding how his presence would and ought to be received. Some 
members struggled to reconcile Trump’s claims that there is "no one more pro-Israel" 
than himself, with the other and more concerning parts of his record, including that he 
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initially failed to disavow the support of former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard David Duke 
(Golshan 2016, paragraph 8). Despite AIPAC’s practice of allowing each dignified 
person, regardless of their political party or politics, to speak and to greet them earnestly, 
some of AIPAC’s left-leaning attendees considered breaking this traditional procedure of 
decorum. In the days leading up to the conference, a group of Rabbis planned to walk out 
during Trump’s remarks. Rabbi David Paskin, one of the organizers of the walkout, 
shared that the walkout was “about denouncing hatred in all forms;” it was a reaction to 
“Trump calling Mexican immigrants’ rapists, most Muslims terrorists, and American 
Jews money-hungry negotiators” (Golshan 2016, paragraph 5). 
During the conference, many questioned whether a larger group of people would 
join the walk-out during Trump’s speech; in other words, would there be a noticeable 
shift in attitude and enthusiasm among attendees when Trump walked on stage? While 
there were certainly individuals who were excited about Trump’s invitation to speak at 
AIPAC and happily welcomed him to the conference stage, there were also certainly 
others who either silently or loudly bemoaned his presence at the conference. During the 
speech however the crowd largely remained attentive, silent, and enthusiastic, except for 
one Orthodox rabbi who was carried off by security moments after he stood up to protest 
Trump (“Rabbi protests Trump's AIPAC speech” 2016). 
At the same time as thousands of American Jews gathered inside of the 2016 
AIPAC Policy Conference to welcome then candidate Trump, a very different movement 
of young Jewish Americans gathered outside of the convention center in protest of 
AIPAC and its decision to host Donald Trump. Unlike the group of Rabbis who 
unobtrusively protested the event and attended the rest of the conference, supporting 
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AIPAC and its pro-Israel mission, the majority of this group of Jewish protesters united 
to stand against both AIPAC and Trump. Comprising approximately 200 people, this 
protest was organized by IfNotNow (INN). Protests outside of AIPAC’s events by 
American Jews, along with other interest groups such as those that are pro-Palestinian, 
are not an irregular occurrence. However, the 2016 protests outside of AIPAC’s Policy 
Conference, and small groups from within, are significant, for they demonstrate the 
beginning of larger shifts taking place within American Jewish interest groups, stemming 
from American political changes. 
By 2017, the number of American Jews who mobilized outside of AIPAC’s 
annual Policy Conference grew by 500%, as compared to the year prior. With more than 
1000 protestors, this was the largest, mostly Jewish, anti-AIPAC protest in the 
organization’s 54-year history (Bellware 2017). Although American Jews have long 
protested and questioned the policies of established Jewish organizations, this particular 
protest should be regarded as significant both due its magnitude, along with the 
implications it relayed regarding a newly fissuring American Jewish divide. During the 
protest, activists sought to attract the attention of conference attendees. For example, four 
INN activists purchased tickets to the event, came inside, and dropped banners from the 
convention center’s third floor asserting, “reject AIPAC and the occupation” before 
security guards quickly removed them from the venue (Gutman 2017). 
 These distinct groups of American Jews—gathering either inside AIPAC or 
outside the conference hall—depict the multitude of American Jewish responses to the 
rise of Trump. Whereas the vast majority of the group inside prioritized their support for 
Israel, the group protesting outside the conference united in protest of the American 
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Jewish establishment’s unequivocal support for Israel and embrace of Donald Trump. 
This example exemplifies the opposing visions of Judaism adopted by the groups 
gathered inside and outside of the conference; while particularism compelled conference 
attendees to continuously support Israel despite the costs, protesters were drawn by a 
value of social justice inherent to universalism. 
J Street and AIPAC Conventions  
Since the 2016 election, the increase of attendance, or lack thereof, of prominent 
Democratic politicians at both AIPAC and J Street’s annual national conferences, as well 
as INN’s effective rallying calls to #SkipAIPAC, helps to indicate the extent to which the 
changing American political culture as well as political organizing by American Jewish 
groups have impacted American Jewish interest groups. In particular, factions within the 
Democratic party have affected AIPAC’s historically friendly relationship to presidential 
candidates and have made J Street’s policies more palatable to mainstream Democratic 
politicians. As compared to 2016 when all remaining Republican and Democratic 
primary candidates (besides Bernie Sanders) spoke at AIPAC, in 2019 and 2020, many 
major Democratic party candidates chose not to attend AIPAC’s Policy Conference. In 
2019, many of the major Democratic party candidates including Senator Bernie Sanders, 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, Senator Kamala Harris, and Major Pete Buttigieg skipped the 
event (Hagen 2019). At AIPAC 2020, the only candidate to speak in person was Michael 
Bloomberg, and Vice President Biden and Senator Klobouchar joined by video (Kelly 
2020). Since the AIPAC 2020 Policy Conference overlapped with Super Tuesday it was 
difficult to determine the true extent to which evolving views of Israel have influenced 
candidates’ choices to speak.  
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The lack of candidate attendance may be attributed to the Democratic party’s 
evolving views on Israel as a result of growing political activism among (often young) 
American Jews. There is a growing partisan divide on Israel among both Democratic 
voters and candidates. Sheryl Stolberg in her article “Trump and Netanyahu Put 
Bipartisan Support for Israel at Risk,” that this divide is “evident on the presidential 
campaign trail, where Democrats once vied to see who could be the most supportive of 
Israel. Now, some are vying to see who can be the most critical.” (Stolberg 2019). Young 
liberal voters have pressured Democratic candidates to make the unprecedented choice to 
skip AIPAC’s annual Policy Conference. IfNotNow and two other progressive groups 
that don’t focus primarily on Israel, MoveOn and the Working Families Party, have led 
the #SkipAIPAC campaign (IfNotNow 2020). The campaign has pushed candidates to 
publicly commit to “not join AIPAC’s stage, send in a video message, or attend any 
official or unofficial event affiliated with AIPAC’s 2020 Conference (IfNotNow 2020). 
As a result of this campaign, two top contenders — Senators Elizabeth Warren and 
Bernie Sanders—agreed to boycott the conference. This move is significant, for it is the 
“first time top contenders...have boycotted the massive American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee policy conference, a signature event on the American Jewish calendar” 
(Boorstein 2020, paragraph 2).   
Meanwhile, back in October 2019 several prominent Democratic presidential 
hopefuls spoke at J Street’s 2019 national convention, which may illustrate the role that 
progressive Jewish Americans have played in shifting Democratic party leaders’ views 
on Israel. J Street hosted five Democratic party candidates, including mainstream 
Democrats Mayor Pete Buttigiege and progressive leaders Senators Warren and Sanders. 
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While speaking, the candidates were not afraid to criticize Israel. For example, several 
candidates said they were “open to withholding aid from Israel if it annexed more land in 
the West Bank” (Medina 2019).  In Jennifer Medina’s New York Times article, “2020 
Democrats at J Street Conference Reflect New Tone on U.S.-Israel Relations,” she argues 
that the candidates’ willingness to speak openly about how they would address the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territory demonstrates that “Democratic attitudes toward Israel 
are shifting in the highest echelons of the party” (Medina 2019). The democratic 
candidates’ attendance at J Street in larger numbers may also illustrate how the 
organization has benefited from the political polarization that challenge’s AIPAC’s 
ability to maintain bipartisanship over pro-Israel politics. These politicians might be 
understood as moving over from AIPAC to J Street because the organization’s vision and 
values are more palatable to mainstream democrats, allowing them to appeal to a broader 
spectrum of voters within the party.  
AIPAC’s Challenges 
AIPAC has faced challenges since Trump’s election as a result of the President’s 
strategy “aimed at dividing the Democratic Party and pushing some Jewish voters into 
the arms of Republicans” through “paint[ing] Republicans as Israel’s only true friend in 
Washington” (Stolberg 2019). One example of this strategy was when Trump pushed 
“Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel into barring an official visit by the first 
two Muslim women in Congress” (Stolberg 2019). As Trump aims to gain the support of 
Jewish voters, especially single-issue voters seeking to elect candidates who support 
Israel, AIPAC has sought to retain bipartisanship despite challenges. As such, AIPAC 
split with Trump and Netanyahu on its decision to bar the congresswomen from entering 
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Israel, sharing in a statement that they believe “every member of Congress should be able 
to visit and experience our democratic ally Israel firsthand" (Jerusalem Post 2019). Many 
pro-Israel supporters from across the political spectrum also worry that “the president 
could further erode bipartisan support for Israel,” creating long term consequences 
including undermining Israel’s security, and furthering the United States’ position in the 
Middle East (Stolberg 2019). 
 At the same time that Trump has sought to divide the Democratic party on Israel, 
AIPAC has also embraced and praised the Trump Administration for taking concrete pro-
Israel actions, such as moving the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, and continue the 
decades-long ‘special’ relationship between the United States and Israel. AIPAC would 
argue that they have the same support from its members as always and that they have 
been incredibly successful in working with the Trump administration to institute pro-
Israel policies. However, in spite of this support from the current President, AIPAC has 
faced challenges since the 2016 elections as a result of two phenomena: political 
polarization between Democrats and Republicans, and rifts between leftist and 
progressive factions within the Democratic Party. That AIPAC commands a large amount 
of power and recognition both within American Jewish life and American Politics means 
that the organization has often been subject to criticism. Nonetheless, the particular 
nature and fervor of AIPAC’s criticism and challenges by American Jews since 2016 has 
been unique and unprecedented in the organization’s decades-long history. 
AIPAC’s embrace of both the Trump administration and Israel’s Netanyahu 
government calls into question the ability of AIPAC to garner support from both its 
Jewish Democratic members as well as politicians. For Democrats who align with 
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AIPAC’s pro-Israel beliefs yet disagree with Trump’s illiberal actions, embracing Israel 
in an age of unprecedented U.S. polarization will challenge their ability to express 
unwavering support. As Mark Mellman, the president of Democratic Majority for Israel, 
a nonprofit that works to ensure that the Democratic Party remains pro-Israel, described, 
“in our hyperpartisan world, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, and to the extent that 
Democrats look at Trump as the enemy, if they see Israel or the Netanyahu 
administration as operating hand in glove, that gives them real pause” (Stolberg 2019). 
Although AIPAC’s membership today is likely split between Republicans and 
Democrats, Peter Beinart argues that these numbers will likely dwindle in the future as a 
result of demographic differences between younger and older American Jews. He 
describes that, for older American Jews, “their broader liberalism inclines them to vote 
Democratic. But their anxiety about Jewish safety and commitment to the Zionist project 
incline them to join AIPAC” (Beinart 2018). However, young (non-orthodox) American 
Jews are “less likely to bifurcate their views in this way” (Beinart 2018).  
AIPAC has responded to these challenges by engaging in a struggle to maintain 
bipartisanship. According to Beinart, the organization is “doubling down on 
bipartisanship and ideological diversity even as tectonic shifts in American politics and 
culture make that harder and harder” (Beinart 2018). One example of this was AIPAC’s 
appeal to left and progressive factions of the pro-Israel movement in attendance at 2018 
Policy Conference. The President of AIPAC Mort Fridman pled to the many thousands of 
attendees, “the progressive narrative for Israel is just as compelling and critical as the 
conservative one…There are very real forces trying to pull you out of this hall and out of 
this movement and we cannot let that happen — we will not let that happen!” (Kampeas 
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2018). The organization has also responded to these challenges through hosting 
Democratic speakers—some to the left of Netanyahu. For example, AIPAC featured 
former Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm, who called Israel a “progressive 
paradise” (Beinart 2018). The CEO of AIPAC, Howard Kohr, also endorsed a two-state 
solution, putting AIPAC “theoretically” to the left of Israel’s right-wing government 
(Beinart 2018).  
Another important challenge that AIPAC has faced since the 2016 election are the 
significant internal changes within the Democratic Party. These changes have made it 
more difficult for AIPAC to appeal to their left-leaning membership as well as target 
Democratic politicians. One of the most significant and recent examples of progressive 
politicians questioning AIPAC’s power is Minnesota Democratic Rep. Ilhan Omar vocal 
criticism of Israel and AIPAC. In February, Omar responded to a “tweet from journalist 
Glenn Greenwald, who posted about House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy threatening to 
punish Omar and another congresswoman for being critical of Israel” (Nelson 2019). 
Omar posted, "It's all about the Benjamins baby," suggesting that the reason the U.S. 
solidly supports Israel is because of money (Nelson 2019). This tweet sparked extensive 
criticism arguing that the tweet was anti-Semitic, for it called upon a “negative and 
harmful stereotype of Jewish Americans” regarding Jewish people, money, and political 
influence (Nelson 2019). Omar apologized and said that she was learning about "the 
painful history of anti-Semitic tropes," yet still “reaffirm[ed] the problematic role of 
lobbyists in our politics, whether it be AIPAC, the NRA or fossil fuel industry” (Omar, 
Twitter, 2019). This incident illustrated the vast disagreements between progressive 
democrats and Democratic party leaders, like Speaker Nancy Pelosi, on Israel (and other 
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topics). In response to Omar's remarks, the House passed a resolution condemning hatred, 
including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; Jewish Democrats had initially pushed for 
version of the resolution that focused only on condemning anti-Semitism (Marcos 2019). 
In reference to Omar’s tweet, Pelosi spoke at AIPAC Policy Conference the month 
following, saying that “the full House came together to condemn the anti-Semitic myth of 
dual loyalty and all forms of bigotry” (Marcos 2019).  
Overall, changes in American politics since 2016 have confronted AIPAC’s 
commitment and mission of bipartisanship, their members’ willingness to continue 
coming together and reach across the aisle and support pro-Israel causes, and the 
organization’s power within Washington. As a result, challenges to bipartisanship and the 
growing divergence of views within the Democratic party make it more difficult for 
AIPAC to control a narrative of widespread support for Israel. The growth and 
mobilization of the two other case study organizations are an important part of this 
picture and will be discussed in the following subsections.  
The Jewish Left 
Fundamental changes in American Politics have led to growth, challenges, and 
polarization on the Jewish left. The mobilization of far-left progressive groups have led to 
a divergence between left and far-left groups. Although these groups do agree on some 
principles and share liberal values that promote the importance of social justice and 
human rights, these groups disagree as to how to approach a Jewish connection to Israel. 
Whereas center-left groups promote the unique Jewish connection to the land of Israel, 
groups further to the left either reject Zionism altogether or remain silent on this issue. 
The differences of views between these two groups, and how the rise of Trump catalyzed 
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the growth of far-left-progressive groups, creates challenges for Jewish groups on the 
center-left. I will explore the divergence of views and complicated relationship between 
Jewish groups on the center- and far-left through examining the relationship between J 
Street and IfNotNow.  
The differences in age and ideology between the progressive- and center-left 
within American Jewish Israel-politics mirrors the broader schisms within American 
politics more generally. Within the democratic party, younger people are challenging the 
older, more established leaders and groups to better integrate progressive norms into the 
broader party platform. The same is occurring within American Jewish life, particularly 
with Israel-politics. As Michelle Boorstein describes in her Washington Post article, 
“#SkipAIPAC comes from new generation of Jewish activists,” these new groups are 
“the product of post-millennial liberal politics, with antipathy toward nationalism of all 
kinds and a hunger to tear down the entire system of money in politics” (Boorstein 2020). 
While J Street’s founder Jeremy Ben Ami did say that he finds IfNotNow “really 
exciting,” he also finds the newer groups distancing from pro-Israel norms as 
“extraordinarily sad” (Boorstein 2020) (Reisman 2019, paragraph 11). Whereas J Street 
sees itself as providing a liberal alternative to AIPAC, Ben Ami describes how younger 
progressive groups separate themselves from J Street through expressing “‘you don’t 
have to be pro-Israel, you should be pro-human rights, and everyone should have a state’” 
(Boorstein 2020).  
Since the 2016 election led to the empowerment and mobilization of far-left 
groups, represented by the growth of INN, this political event also furthered the 
divergence of views within the democratic party, and within American Jewish politics on 
 
 
 90 
Israel. While the organization was founded prior to the 2016 election, IfNotNow’s 
membership and mobilization grew in conjunction to broader and cumulatively 
progressive Democratic movements responding to the rise of Trump, championing an 
intersectional fight for social justice. Changes within the Democratic party leading to a 
schism between progressive and moderate factions has altered the Democratic party’s 
platform and candidates’ positions on Israel to more closely align with progressive views 
of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The mobilization of INN (and other like-minded 
organizations) are correlated with transformational changes within the Democratic Party 
and growing devotion to progressive causes and leadership. For example, IfNotNow’s 
2020 platform calls upon American public officials to join young Jewish Americans in 
“fighting for a better future — not just for American Jews but for all people” (IfNotNow 
2020 Platform 2020). INN’s two-pronged platform, “Defunding Occupation” and “Fight 
Anti-Semitism and White Supremacy,” constructs the connection between all suffering 
and intolerance in the world today and promotes the importance of fighting for justice for 
all peoples and not only the Jewish people (IfNotNow 2020 Platform 2020). 
INN also understands itself as part of a progressive coalition that seeks to bridge 
the ideological and generational divides within the Democratic party. For example, INN 
aligned itself with other progressive Democratic organizations to share a #YouthVote 
Letter with the presumptive Democratic nominee for the 2020 presidential election, Vice 
President Joe Biden. The groups asked Biden to champion a set of progressive policies 
regarding climate change, gun violence prevention, immigration, and healthcare (among 
others) in order to “earn the support of our generation and unite the party for a general 
election against Donald Trump” (#YouthVote Letter to Joe Biden, 2020).  
 
 
 91 
Meanwhile, younger generations of supporters have also sought to push forward 
more progressive changes within mainstream institutions, like J Street, to maintain 
relevance, galvanize support, and meet the challenges of the current moment. One 
example of this was when thirty-five of J Street U’s (the university affiliate of J Street) 
past and present board members sent a letter to J Street’s founder and president Ben-Ami 
and the J Street Board asking for the organization to take “bold action … that responds 
appropriately to this political moment” by “imposing actual, tangible costs” for Israel’s 
occupation policies Current and former members of J Street U National Board 2018) 
(Saleh and Grim 2019). As justification for taking these actions, the J Street U board 
members cited changes in the base of the Democratic party as their reasoning: 
In the past we may have feared that such a move would have compromised a 
base of support among key backers. However, recently documented shifts in the 
base of the Democratic Party and the successful campaigns of Rashida Tlaib 
and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, candidates to J Street’s left who are widely 
supported by young people in particular, demonstrate that there could be 
widespread support amongst the democratic base for a strategic yet sharper-
edged posture towards the Israeli-occupation—and that J Street must activate 
this base, at least partially in order to be in tune with the politics of our 
generation (Current and former members of J Street U National Board 2018). 
 
This letter illustrates that young people actively involved in J Street both recognize the 
importance of what is happening to the left of their group through the energy of young 
progressive Jews, and how the growth of this movement represents inherent challenges to 
J Street. They see that in order for their organization to stay relevant and to continue 
making a difference they will have to evolve their policies and efforts to the challenges of 
the current times. The 2018 J Street U letter also clearly demonstrates how the 2016 
election, and the fundamental changes in American politics stemming from it, directly 
impacts their interest group’s power, political base, and views of their supporters.  
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Conclusion 
As discussed in chapter 2, there were already existing divisions across American 
Jewish life prior to 2016, including vastly different generational experiences and political 
divides. The 2016 election however played an important role in furthering trends of 
political mobilization on the far left, as well as contributed to political polarization. The 
transformations within American political culture resulting from the 2016 election 
furthered the already existing divisions among American Jews.  
This chapter depicts the interaction between American politics and American 
Jewish political life. The many different groups of American Jews have had opposing 
reactions to the election of Donald Trump and his alignment with establishment pro-
Israel interest groups’ policies. Some American Jewish interest groups have thanked 
Trump for his pro-Israel policies. For others, establishment organizations’ support for 
Trump’s pro-Israel policies have further alienated them from these institutions. Many 
liberal Jews have organized into progressive groups that question not only Trump’s 
illiberal policies towards other minority groups but also their own community’s role in 
perpetuating injustice towards the Palestinian people.  
The growing divide between American Jews over Israel is similarly entangled 
with the evolving opinions of American Democratic politics on Israel. At the same time 
as young American Jewish have flocked to liberal organizations that are more critical of 
Israel, Democratic politicians have taken a new approach to Israel. For example, several 
of the progressive, female candidates who won during the 2018 midterm election have 
explicitly challenged mainstream groups and politicians with outspoken pro-Israel views.  
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The direct impact of American politics on American Jewish politics related to 
Israel can be seen through each of the three case study organizations representing 
different populations and beliefs of American Jews. The alignment of Trump with Israeli 
PM Netanyahu, and AIPAC’s support for Trump have made AIPAC’s efforts of retaining 
its democratic base more difficult. Bipartisanship has grown increasingly rare across 
American politics, yet establishment leaders have continued to promote the idea that 
being pro-Israel is essentially bipartisan. With so many Democratic members who 
support their organization, AIPAC feels that they must push back on those who challenge 
bipartisanship through bringing in more liberal speakers and appealing to the progressive 
wing of the organization to stay involved. On the center-left, J Street has received more 
support from Democratic leadership who have grown more publicly critical of Israel 
since 2016, while still wanting to support the state’s right to exist. However, young Jews 
involved with J Street have simultaneously watched the energy grow further to their left, 
leading them to question whether the future of their organization requires them to become 
more progressive. On the far-left, American Jewish interest groups have experienced 
massive growth in their protests and involvement since 2016. They have aligned with 
other Jewish and non-Jewish interest groups to push back against the Jewish 
establishment’s support for Israel. The distinctions between the Jewish center-left and 
progressive interest groups has also grown clearer, especially as groups like IfNotNow 
cross certain red lines.  
The impact of American politics on these three case study organizations illustrates 
that the 2016 election played an important role in shaping of American Jews’ political 
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opinions and interest groups, leading to challenges to bipartisanship and spurring into 
action progressive groups seeking to end the Israeli occupation.  
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5 
Conclusion 
 
My thesis sought to answer the research question, how have fundamental changes 
in American political culture since the 2016 election shaped American Jews political 
stances and affected the representation of viewpoints within American Jewish interest 
groups? My research brings light to the growing polarization and mobilization across 
American Jewish life today. These changes were a result of already existing internal 
American Jewish divides and trends, including generational differences and the diverging 
beliefs of American and Israeli Jews, that were then furthered catalyzed by changes in 
American political culture resulting from the 2016 election.  
When I first began my research to answer this question, I realized that there was a 
real deficiency of polling data that studied the relationship between recent changes in 
American politics and those experienced within American Jewish political life. 
Therefore, I sought other forms of evidence for this link, relying upon an organizational 
analysis. By analyzing three organizations that represent different aspects of American 
Jewish life, political opinions, and cultures, I depicted the many interrelated trends 
occurring across different groups of American Jews today. When examined together, 
these trends illustrate a constantly evolving American Jewish community, malleable to 
the secular political and cultural trends occurring within the United States.  
For those interested in this research question, further analysis and polling data are 
necessary to better understand the connection between changes in American politics and 
that within American Jewish life (as well as other religious or affinity groups). Although 
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I chose to explore how recent changes in American politics impacted American Jewish 
politics through looking specifically at Jewish Israel-related organizations, these changes 
affected other realms, including mobilizing progressive Jewish organization focused 
solely on promoting social justice, and not on Israel. 
Divisions 
 The rise of Trump in 2016—and the subsequent transformations within American 
political culture—furthered and illuminated the already existing divisions within 
American Jewish politics. Trump’s unprecedented support for the Israeli right-wing 
government, as well as his polarizing presidency, have created new challenges and 
opportunities for American Jews across the political spectrum. Many young and liberal 
Jews have joined the subsequent progressive political protests in response to Trump’s 
election and his anti-Minority policies. Other mainstream Democratic Jews who are 
emotionally attached to Israel have had to grapple with how to support a cause that is 
now aligned with Trump. The recent growth of a progressive anti-Israel wing within the 
Democratic party has also challenged pro-Israel Democrats, pushing them to wrestle 
between their value of social justice and attachment towards Israel. At the same time, the 
leaders and members of establishment Jewish institutions who lean more to the right on 
the issue of Israel have been forced to respond to the ever-changing demographic of 
American Jews, especially young Jews.  
 Young American Jews’ increasing participation in liberal movements as a result 
of the 2016 election aligns with broader trends among young people across America. The 
rise of Trump added fuel to progressive social movements that mobilized to counteract 
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Trump’s conservative and anti-minority policies. These American Jews have been active 
participants in these broad-based protests for the rights of underrepresented minorities in 
America. For instance, thousands of people from across the country showed up at 
“protests to speak out against the detention and mistreatment of undocumented 
immigrants” (Kuruvilla 2019). American Jewish support for liberal causes efforts has 
grown increasingly organized. Never Again Action, a Jewish organization founded in 
June 2019 “fighting to end the US’ cruel immigration policies” now has 50 local chapters 
throughout the United States (Never Again Action). Since 2016, progressive American 
Jews have not only come together to support their neighbors and allies but also have 
supported causes that strike closer to home. They have formed and mobilized into 
organizations, seeking to end American Jewish organizations’ monetary and political 
support for the Israeli occupation of Palestinians. 
The resulting divisions within the American Jewish community over Israel 
politics also mirrors the broader societal discord between progressive and conservative 
Americans. American Jewish discord is just one instance of many wherein the rise of 
Trump furthered existing disagreements and disunity within affinity groups. The 
transformation of American Jewish political opinions and interest groups relays that the 
2016 election impacted American life in many ways, pervading religious life and making 
cohesion among communities and their beliefs much more difficult.  
Narrowing In 
American Jews’ participation and leadership in progressive American political 
protests to support the political rights of minorities show how Jews have integrated 
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themselves into broader American political culture. Their willingness to create and join 
progressive movements that lift up other minorities demonstrates their commitment to 
universalism. As a minority that has faced severe persecution, American Jews are 
concerned not only with the well-being of their community today but also with ensuring 
the rights of others. Newer and progressive organizations approach historical Jewish 
suffering history as all the more reason to support other oppressed people in the world 
and transform oppressive institutions. For example, Never Again Action asks Jews to join 
the fight for undocumented immigrants in ICE detention centers because “Anne Frank 
didn’t die in a gas chamber. Anne Frank died because she caught an infectious disease in 
a concentration camp. We have seen this before. We won’t let it happen again. Never 
again is now” (Never Again Action). 
Like their progressive allies across America, progressive Jews have grown 
increasingly wary of powerful institutions that dictate what to believe and support. 
Instead, young Jews have flocked to join organizations that instead allocate power into 
the hands of the people, as opposed to the leadership. For instance, the mobilization and 
growth of IfNotNow illustrates that young Jews, like the rest of their secular peers, seek 
truth and uphold universal values that prioritize an intersectional understanding of justice.  
On the other hand, among establishment American Jewish institutions there is a 
resistance to change. Historical Jewish suffering motivates Jews to support the security of 
modern-day Israel at all costs. Within organizations like AIPAC, public criticism of Israel 
is off-limits—at the risk of legitimizing the arguments of one’s enemies. However, 
placing limits on an internal conversation regarding Israel’s flaws, particularly its 
mistreatment of the Palestinian people and more than fifty years of Occupation, has had 
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real costs. Although for some American Jews Israel and Zionism are so bound up in their 
identity that they are willing to incur these costs to support Israel, others are not willing 
to sacrifice this for their values that emphasize ensuring the rights and justice of all 
peoples. Establishment organizations’ resistance to evolving with the current times has, 
as a result, led to real sacrifices in terms of gaining widespread support from young Jews. 
These organizations’ positions likely have and will continue to alienate young American 
Jews, furthering the trend of “distancing.” As such, if these institutions continue on the 
current path, it will contribute to a birth-cycle effect in which the percentage of Jews in 
younger generations feel less and less of an emotional attachment to Israel. 
Of course, there are some American Jews who have sought a middle ground, 
supporting liberal Zionist organizations like J Street that straddle promoting a Jewish 
connection to Israel as well as human rights and social justice. However, trends of 
political polarization—both across America and within Jewish communities—have 
brought right-leaning and leftist American Jews further from one another ideologically. 
This trend has made a compromise of values increasingly difficult and has strengthened 
forces from both sides to pull centrist groups in two different directions. For instance, 
university-level leadership in J Street has found the newfound energy among youth in 
progressive organizations compelling, recognizing that to take advantage of this energy 
and power, their organization must compromise and evolve with the times.  
 The nature of the modern world has created further challenges and opportunities 
for change. Technology has improved access to information and made possible the 
mobilization of young Americans from across the country. IfNotNow’s #younevertoldme 
campaign, in which alumni of Jewish organizations describe their experiences in 
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American Jewish institutions that blocked access to information and shared a one-sided 
perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would not have been possible to the same 
extent fifteen-years ago. Without access to information through the internet regarding the 
conflict, and to social media that allows opportunities to connect with others with similar 
experiences, many of the changes today would not have been possible.  
Zooming out  
 The changes in American Jewish life explored throughout my thesis depict the 
way that American politics impact the internal politics of affinity and religious groups. 
Although such groups like American Jews often have their own prevailing internal 
cultures and conflicts, they are simultaneously influenced by the broader societal cultural 
movements of its time. In American Jewish life and elsewhere, the influence of outside 
culture and politics on the groups internally can spark new challenges; groups might 
become torn between preserving tradition and the existing status quo as opposed to 
reforming practices and beliefs to the modern day. This tension between maintaining 
tradition and transforming to fit into the contemporary values can be seen within the 
conflict between American Jewish Israel-related groups. The vast spectrum of beliefs—
from unwavering support for Israel on the right to upholding solidarity with the 
Palestinians on the far-left—illustrates the diverging political responses of American 
Jews as a result of confronting the modern world. Whereas the right has clung to 
traditional values, the far-left has embraced present day values of social justice and 
human rights. These different approaches demonstrate the challenges that the modern 
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world creates in terms of interactions with particular groups with their own internal 
cultures, values, and politics.  
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